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Abstract
Tracing the lives of Chinese migrants through multi-lingual archives in Taiwan, Singapore,
Netherlands, and Indonesia, Imperial Crossings is a trans-imperial history of Chinese indentured
migration to Sumatra in the Netherlands Indies. Between 1881 to 1900, more than 121,000 Chinese
migrants left southern China, stopping in the port-cities of Singapore and Penang in the British
Straits Settlements before leaving again to labor in the tobacco plantations of Dutch Sumatra. The
journey of these labor migrants across multiple imperial jurisdictions tied their itineraries with
those of a disparate set of characters: Leiden-trained sinologists, young German and Dutch
merchants chasing profits, Qing officials thinking about China’s position in the world, British
legislators debating about freedom, and Chinese brotherhoods making money in Malaya.
Imperial Crossings weaves these intertwined histories of migration through Philip Kuhn’s
framework of a “migration corridor,” a living space that connects migrants to their native place.
The efforts of Straits Settlements and Netherlands Indies officials in the 1870s to regulate the
movement of Chinese labor migrants between the two colonies emerged out of a paradoxical need
to secure the “freedom” of migrants through bureaucratic controls, which strengthened the AngloDutch border in the Straits of Melaka and obstructed the corridor. In the 1880s, Dutch planters
attempted to redirect this corridor to contest the power of Chinese players in the migration
industry by recruiting laborers directly from southern China, bypassing the Straits Settlements.
These efforts revealed the outsized role minor bureaucrats played in the exercise of imperial
sovereignty, as well as the agency Chinese laborers displayed through spectacular forms of mutiny
and everyday forms of resistance. Concurrently, the migrants and the Qing state each engaged in
a dialectical process of defining the relationship between China and its emigrants through the
corridor. This process configured a globalizing China, which manifested in the migrants’ cultural
networks and the Qing’s assertions of its diplomatic rights as a sovereign state. Redrawing
historiographical boundaries, this essay illuminates how historical transformations in the age of
empire were constituted through the bodies, movement, and imagination of migrants.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1894, a curious pair of authors, the British Presbyterian missionary Archibald Lamont and the
Xiamen-educated Straits Chinese newspaper editor Tan Teck Soon, sat together in Singapore to
write a novel that sought to capture the experience of a Chinese coolie migrant to Deli, a region
in the East Coast of Sumatra in the Netherlands Indies.1 The finished work, Bright Celestials, tells
the story of Tek Chiu, an orphan who lost his parents to the global cholera pandemic of 1881.2
After he is caught in a gambling crackdown, the eighteen-year-old Tek Chiu flees his hometown
in Fujian, China to one of the province’s port-cities. There, he meets a broker who promises him
a rich life as a scribe in Singapore. However, upon arrival in Singapore, Tek Chiu encounters
Chinese brokers and depot-keepers who pressure him to sign a contract as an indentured
laborer.3 Soon he finds himself on board a ship to the plantations of Deli. For all Tek Chiu
knows, Deli is a place that “killed men and grew tobacco.”4
The curious authorship of the novel suggests how the histories of laborers migrating
from Southern China to Eastern Sumatra were intertwined with the itineraries of a wide-ranging,
seemingly disparate set of actors that spanned imperial borders in late 19th-century Asia. During
the peak of the migration between 1881 to 1900, over 121,000 Chinese men traveled across the
South China Sea to labor on the plantations in Deli.5 From their villages in the coastal provinces

The term “coolie” is a sensitive and racialized term used to describe Chinese and Indian laborers employed under
indenture contracts. One possible etymological origin of the term is the Chinese kuli (苦力), which means “bitter
strength.” In this essay, I will use this term in a conscious and non-derogatory manner in reference to the existing
scholarship on the “coolie trade” from China, as well as the categories colonial registers of the Netherlands Indies
and the British Straits Settlements assigned these labor migrants to.
2 John Coming Chinaman, Bright Celestials: The Chinaman at Home and Abroad (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1894).
Christine Doran attributes this work to Archibald Lamont and Tan Teck Soon in Christine Doran, "Bright Celestial:
Progress in the political thought of Tan Teck Soon." Sojourn: 21, no. 1 (2006): 46-67.
3 Labor migrants who first arrived in Singapore were housed in a labor depot, where they were confined until they
find employment. Chinese brotherhoods (kongsi), compatriot organizations that functioned both as ritual
communities and joint-stock enterprises, often ran these labor depots. For a detailed explanation of the kongsi, see
Carl A. Trocki, Opium and Empire: Chinese Society in Colonial Singapore, 1800-1910 (Cornell University Press, 1990), 3.
4 Bright Celestials, 145.
5 These numbers are reconciled from Pieter Willem Modderman, T Volker, and G Veen, Gedenkboek Uitgegeven Ter
Gelegenheid van Het Vijftig Jarig Bestaan van de Deli Planters Vereeniging, (Weltevreden: Kolff, 1929); Jan Breman, Taming
the Coolie Beast: Plantation Society and the Colonial Order in Southeast Asia (Oxford University Press, 1989), 60; and
Hendrik Johannes Bool, De Chineesche Immigratie Naar Deli (Utrecht, 1904), Appendix. Adam McKeown notes that
between 1879 and 1933, over 300,000 indentured Chinese laborers migrated to Deli and Bangka in the East Coast of
1
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of Fujian and Guangdong in southern China, the men left for the port-cities of Shantou and
Xiamen where they would embark on ships, often not knowing that they were headed towards
the Netherlands Indies. Particularly before 1889, many would stop first in Singapore and Penang
in the British Straits Settlements, before leaving again for the tobacco plantations in Deli across
the Straits of Melaka. The circuitous journey of these migrants, on ships, steamers, sampans,
tongkangs, and trains, formed corridors that traversed multiple jurisdictions, in particular, that of
Qing China, as well as the British and Dutch empires of Southeast Asia.

Figure 1: Map of Southeast Asia and China. By author.

Sumatra. See Adam McKeown, “Chinese Emigration in Global Context, 1850–1940*,” Journal of Global History 5, no.
1 (March 2010), 102.
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Scholars have written about the movement of these laborers, but they have focused on
the points of departure, transit, and arrival, rather than the points of intersection and
engagement. Histories of Deli in Sumatra employ Dutch and Indonesian sources to provide indepth analyses of the violent capital-labor relations of the plantation and offer powerful critiques
of the repressive policies of the Dutch plantocracy.6 Works that study the Chinese diaspora in
the Straits Settlements provide social histories of migrants as rickshaw pullers and opium
farmers, detailed expositions of Chinese immigration to the British colony, and analyses of
networks of rich Chinese merchants across Southeast Asia.7 Yet, labor migrant connections
between the two colonies, and to China, are rarely explored.8 Anthony Reid’s investigation of the
mechanics of Chinese indentured labor migration to Eastern Sumatra is the sole exception,
considering both British and Dutch perspectives.9 Still, the Chinese laborers’ own projects of
maintaining their ties to China are missing, alongside the role of an increasingly active Qing state
that desired to protect the rights of its population overseas.

Jan Breman, Taming the Coolie Beast: Plantation Society and the Colonial Order in Southeast Asia (Oxford University Press,
1989), Karl Josef Pelzer, Planter and Peasant: Colonial Policy and the Agrarian Struggle in East Sumatra, 1863-1947
(Springer Netherlands, 1981), and Ann Laura Stoler, Capitalism and Confrontation in Sumatra’s Plantation Belt, 1870-1979
(University of Michigan Press, 1995).
7 On the social history of poor Chinese laborers in Singapore, see James Francis Warren, Rickshaw Coolie: A People’s
History of Singapore, 1880-1940 (Oxford University Press, 1986), Carl A. Trocki, “Singapore As A Nineteenth Century
Migration Node,” in Connecting Seas and Connected Ocean Rims, ed. Donna R. Gabaccía and Dirk Hoerder (Brill, 2011),
198–224; Yen Ching-Hwang, “Class Structure and Social Mobility in the Chinese Community in Singapore and
Malaya 1800–1911,” Modern Asian Studies 21, no. 3 (July 1987): 417–45. On the formation of bureaucratic structures
that managed the Chinese population in the Straits Settlements, see Ng Siew Yoong, “The Chinese Protectorate in
Singapore, 1877-1900,” Journal of Southeast Asian History 2, no. 1 (March 1961): 76–99. On elite Chinese merchant,
intellectual, and commercial networks expanding across the Straits of Melaka see Wu Xiao An, Chinese Business in the
Making of a Malay State, 1882-1941: Kedah and Penang (Abingdon, Oxon, United States: Taylor & Francis Group,
2003), Yee Tuan Wong, Penang Chinese Commerce in the 19th Century: The Rise and Fall of the Big Five, Local History and
Memoirs 24 (Singapore: ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, 2015), and Mark Ravinder Frost, “Emporium in Imperio:
Nanyang Networks and the Straits Chinese in Singapore, 1819–1914,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 36, no. 1
(February 2005): 29–66. On brotherhoods and Chinese kongsi organizations in the Straits Settlements, see Carl A.
Trocki, Opium and Empire: Chinese Society in Colonial Singapore, 1800-1910 (Cornell University Press, 1990), Maurice
Freedman, “Immigrants and Associations: Chinese in Nineteenth-Century Singapore,” Comparative Studies in Society
and History 3, no. 1 (October 1960): 25–48, and Lau-Fong Mak, The Sociology of Secret Societies: A Study of Chinese Secret
Societies in Singapore and Peninsular Malaysia (Oxford University Press, 1981).
8 Eric Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and States Along a Southeast Asian Frontier, 1865-1915 (Yale
University Press, 2005) provides a rich study of many of these non-elite interactions in the Straits of Melaka, but
Tagliacozzo focuses on the broad category of smugglers, rather than the coolie population in Deli.
9 Anthony Reid, “Early Chinese Migration into North Sumatra,” Studies in the Social History of China and Southeast Asia,
1970, 289–320.
6
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This study seeks to address this lacuna by applying a trans-imperial lens to the migration
of Chinese laborers to Deli.10 It draws from a wide-ranging set of British, Dutch, and Chinese
primary sources, including the colonial reports and legislative council proceedings of the Straits
Settlements, documents written by Deli planters and Netherlands Indies officials, Qing
correspondence, as well as court cases, newspapers, photographs, novels, and Chinese epigraphic
materials. Doing so allows for a more complex history, one that sees the migrant imbricated in
multiple imperial projects that manifested transregionally in late 19th-century Asia, including
projects of border production, economic contest, and political diplomacy.
To bring these interdependent processes together, this study builds upon Philip Kuhn’s
analytical framework of a “migration corridor.” Kuhn sees corridors as both “connective links
and living cultural spaces” that characterized Chinese migration.11 They are “busy channels of
money, social transactions, and culture” between the migrants’ homes and their new
environments; they are made alive through institutions, the flows of people, goods, and income
through time, and ties of belonging and kinship.12 However, in what ways, could such corridors
be obstructed, redirected, or reimagined? And in the period of high colonialism, what role do
imperial actors play in the formation, maintenance, and regulation of such corridors?
First, I examine how efforts to regulate the movement of Chinese coolies to Sumatra
contributed to the production of an imagined and physical Anglo/Dutch border in the Straits of
Melaka. These efforts obstructed the China-to-Deli corridor. In my analysis, I integrate
perspectives introduced in Eric Tagliacozzo’s study of border production in the Straits of Melaka

On studying migration from trans-imperial and global perspectives, see Sunil S. Amrith, “Empires, Diasporas and
Cultural Circulation,” in Writing Imperial Histories, ed. Andrew S. Thompson (Manchester University Press, 2016);
Engseng Ho, "Inter-Asian concepts for mobile societies," The Journal of Asian Studies 76, no. 4 (2017): 907-928; Adam
McKeown, "Conceptualizing Chinese diasporas, 1842 to 1949." Journal of Asian Studies (1999): 306-337. On the study
of inter-imperial networks in microregions similar to the Straits of Melaka, see Jeppe Mulich, In a Sea of Empires:
Networks and Crossings in the Revolutionary Caribbean, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2020); Lauren Benton and
Jeppe Mulich, "The space between empires: Coastal and insular microregions in the early nineteenth-century world,"
in The Uses of Space in Early Modern History, pp. 151-171, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2015.
11 Philip A. Kuhn, Chinese Among Others: Emigration in Modern Times (Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 46.
12 Ibid.
10
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and Adam McKeown’s research on technologies of border control in the United States.13 The
border hardened as colonial officials in the Straits Settlements and the Netherlands Indies
constructed new barriers that limited the mobility of Chinese laborers and brokers.
Then, I study the Deli planters’ efforts to redirect the China-to-Deli migration corridor
by forming a direct channel of recruitment from southern China, rather than through the Straits
Settlements. In contrast to current scholarship from the Dutch academy, which examines these
events through the lens of Sino-Dutch foreign relations rather than migration, I reinterpret the
Deli planters’ pursuit as an inter-imperial attempt to maintain European control over the
corridor in an economic and political struggle with Chinese players in the migration industry:
recruiters, brokers, merchants, and officials.14
Last, I investigate how Deli coolies and the Qing state redefined the China-to-Deli
corridor as a space to imagine the relationship between China and its emigrants, and hence, the
world. The laborers maintained ties that connected them to their native-place (qiaoxiang),
understanding “China” to be grounded in their home communities.15 The Qing government saw
“China” as the imperial Chinese state, which needed to fulfill its Confucian paternal obligation
and assert the rights of its overseas subjects as a sovereign state. In doing so, this chapter departs

Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders and Adam M. McKeown, Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the
Globalization of Borders (Columbia University Press, 2008). While Tagliacozzo does not emphasize immigration
bureaucracies as part of the process of border production he outlines, McKeown’s research illustrates how global
regimes of border control and identification emerged out of efforts to exclude Chinese migrants from the United
States in the late 19th century. On the emergence of colonial bureaucracies as it relates to Indian migration, see
Radhika Mongia, Indian Migration and Empire: A Colonial Genealogy of the Modern State (Duke University Press, 2018).
14 On the recruiting efforts and Sino-Dutch foreign relations, see Frans van Dongen, Tussen neutraliteit en imperialisme
(Groningen: Wolters, 1966), Frans-Paul van der Putten, “Small Powers and Imperialism The Netherlands in China,
1886–1905*,” Itinerario 20, no. 1 (March 1996): 115–31, and Ferry de Goey, Consuls and the Institutions of Global
Capitalism, 1783-1914 (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2014). For biographies on the Netherlands Indies sinologists,
many of whom represented the Deli Planters Association in these negotiations, see R. J. Zwi Werblowsky and
Hartmut Walravens, The Beaten Track of Science: The Life and Work of J.J.M. de Groot, Asien-Und-Afrika-Studien-Der
Humboldt-Universität Zu Berlin, Bd. 10 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2002) and Koos Kuiper, The Early Dutch
Sinologists (1854-1900): Training in Holland and China, Functions in the Netherlands Indies, (Brill, 2017).
15 Here, I respond to Shelly Chan’s call to deconstruct conceptions of a fixed, immutable China, and instead, to
recognize the fluidity of “China” as constructed through discursive and material interactions between China and its
emigrants; most significantly, the co-constitution of China as the homeland and Chinese emigrants as its diaspora.
See Shelly Chan, Diaspora’s Homeland: Modern China in the Age of Global Migration (Duke University Press, 2018), 7-9.
This chapter also builds upon Yen Ching-Hwang’s classic survey describing Qing efforts to protect indentured
migrants both in the Americas and Southeast Asia. Yen Ching-Hwang, Coolies and mandarins: China's protection of
overseas Chinese during the late Chʻing period (1851-1911), (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1985).
13
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from existing scholarship that has either focused on the cultural life of elite Chinese merchants
in Deli, or has examined the coolies’ lives with minimal consideration of their “Chineseness.”16
Taken together, I argue that the China-to-Deli migration corridor was ever-shifting in
shape, direction, and form, as it was entangled in multiple projects of border-making, labor
recruitment, and diplomacy. The corridor could be obstructed. It could be redirected. It could
also be defined in a web of meanings that could not be reduced to physical mobility alone.
Throughout, imperial bureaucracies reached beyond borders to manage the movement of
Chinese migrants, as these migrants slipped through administrative cleavages, resisted in
mutinies, and asserted their own agency within the limits of the corridor. Taking a trans-imperial
approach to studying the mobility of Chinese labor thus opens new pathways of understanding
the migration corridor as a liminal zone, where multiple itineraries, including the migrant’s own,
manifest through space and time.

For works on Chinese life in Medan during the Dutch colonial period, taking an elite perspective, see Dirk A.
Buiskool, “Prominent Chinese during the Rise of a Colonial City: Medan 1890-1942” (2020). On Deli labor history,
see the previously mentioned works of Jan Breman, Taming the Coolie Beast (1989), Karl Josef Pelzer, Planter and
Peasant (1981), and Ann Laura Stoler, Capitalism and Confrontation in Sumatra’s Plantation Belt, 1870-1979 (1995).
16
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CHAPTER ONE
KIDNAPPING AND BORDER-MAKING, 1865-1885
One hot morning in 1877, the Straits Settlements’ interpreter for the Chinese, William Pickering,
received news of a riot on the embankments of the Singapore River.17 A group of eighteen newly
arrived labor migrants from southern China had refused to board a ship. Chew Ah-Nyee, one of
the migrants, was a school principal from Guangdong. A broker had promised him that he could
find work as a clerk in Singapore.18 Chew Ah-Nyee was enticed by the opportunity and boarded
a junk together with ninety other men from his district. He spent his first day in Singapore
locked inside a house in the landing ground of Telok Ayer. The next morning, he was
unexpectedly taken to a boat to work in the tin mines of Sumatra in the Netherlands Indies,
which required a journey by sail across the Straits of Melaka. Surprised, Chew Ah-Nyee and the
other migrants tried to revolt. One of them rejected: “We won’t go… you will sell us as little pigs
to another country.”19
Reporting this incident later to the Legislative Council of the Straits Settlements,
Pickering declared that “the great evil is that our Colony is made a pretext to entrap coolies for
slavery in the neighboring Dutch Settlements.”20 Pickering claimed that it was no place for the
British colonial administration, which advocated for principles of justice and freedom, to allow
for such “extortion and oppression” to happen under its jurisdiction.21 He urged the Straits
government to monitor and regulate the Chinese migrants moving in and out of the Straits
Settlements’ borders.
Pickering’s appeal illustrates the centrality of mobile Chinese laborers to the emergence
of an intricate state bureaucracy that controlled Chinese migration between the Straits

Report by Mr. Pickering on Kidnapping Sinkehs, 23 February 1877, C.O. 275/21, ii.
Ibid, iv.
19 Ibid, iv. The term pig likely referred to the Chinese zhuzai (猪仔), a term describing unfree Chinese labor with
roots from the Chinese coolie trade to the Americas and the Caribbean.
20 Ibid, iii.
21 Ibid.
17
18
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Settlements and the Netherlands Indies, forming new barriers in the China-to-Deli migration
corridor. The creation of an administrative machinery to regulate emigration from the Malay
Peninsula on one side of the Straits, along with the mutual constitution of a similar bureaucracy
managing the inflow of Chinese labor on the other side in Dutch Sumatra, was part of an
ongoing process of border production in the Anglo/Dutch frontier. It was a boundary that had
only been demarcated in the Treaty of 1871 earlier in the decade.22 The formation of
bureaucratic apparatuses to manage Chinese migration further affirmed this boundary, limiting
the movement of migrants in the liminal space of the Straits of Melaka, and strengthened the
divide between the two spheres both in imagination and in practice.
The Paradox of “Freedom”
Cases of newly arrived Chinese migrants being “kidnapped” in Singapore were not
shocking news for the port-city’s readers in the late 19th-century, as these stories made their way
into the press. In 1872, the Straits Times Overland Journal reported that the coast guard had
arrested a group of thugs that secretly took four Chinese laborers on small, wooden sampans to
board the steamer Far East.23 The Far East would have brought them to the tobacco plantations
of Deli in Eastern Sumatra. Such stories had even emerged in southern China. In Shantou and
Fuzhou, printed placards warned potential sojourners that those who traveled to Singapore
would be “puckerowed” on arrival to labor in Deli.24
The route for Chinese labor migrants to stop in Singapore before leaving again for
Eastern Sumatra had only existed for eight years. In 1865, the Dutch pioneer of the tobacco
plantations of Deli, J. Nienhuys, brought 88 Chinese and 23 Malay men from Penang to work on
the plantations he had started.25 In 1864, the Dutch recorded only twenty Chinese in the region,
working as goldsmiths and small shopkeepers.26 With the expansion of the tobacco industry, the

Eric Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders, 29.
Straits Times Overland Journal, March 28, 1872, 4.
24 Legislative Council, 9 September 1878, C.O. 275/16, 141.
25 Schadee, W H M. Geschiedenis van Sumatra’s Oostkust. Amsterdam: Oostkust van Sumatra-Instituut, 1918, 175-177.
26 Reid, “Early Chinese Migration into North Sumatra,” 292.
22
23
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Chinese population in Deli increased to 4,000 in 1872.27 Backed with capital from the
Netherlands Trading Society, Nienhuys’ company, the Deli Maatschappij, alone imported 800
Chinese laborers from Penang in 1869.
In 1873, a petition from the elite Straits Chinese community to Straits Settlements
Governor Harry Ord prompted him to devise laws to manage the flow of Chinese labor in and
out of Singapore. Five Chinese merchants along with 42 other Chinese firms, signed a petition
calling for an ordinance to “prevent bad characters from kidnapping the newly arrived
migrants.”28 In historian Eunice Thio’s view, “self-interest and perhaps philanthropy” motivated
these merchants to submit these petitions. 29 The merchants had suffered from a labor shortage
in 1876 and faced serious competition for labor from the Deli plantations.
Regardless of their motivations, the Chinese elite succeeded in pushing Governor Ord to
propose an unprecedented administrative machinery in the British colony, which would expand
the state’s capacity to record and track Chinese laborers who were entering its borders.
Borrowing James Scott’s term, such a system of registration represented the colonial
government’s attempts to make migrants “legible,” reflecting the practice of modern states to
“see” and grasp the complexities of human realities through schematic categories, documents,
and statistics.30 Ord’s bill required every unskilled Chinese coming to the Straits Settlements to
be registered as an immigrant. A Registration Officer would board every ship carrying more than

Reid, “Early Chinese Migration into North Sumatra,” 293.
Petition from Chinese Merchants relative to the treatment of Chinese Immigrants, June 22, 1873, C.O. 275/16,
149. The five merchant petitioners were Tan Kim Ching, Whampoa, Seah Eu Chin, Tan Seng Poh, and Cheang
Hong Lim. They maintained a close relationship with the British colonial government, which had relied on them to
govern the Chinese population in Singapore. Tan Seng Poh was a powerful revenue farmer who amalgamated the
major opium farming syndicates of Singapore, Johor, Riau, and Melaka under a single “Great Syndicate” together
with Cheang Hong Lim. Seah Eu Chin was Tan Seng Poh’s brother-in-law, whose pepper and gambier plantation
holdings formed the dominant bloc of the Gambier and Pepper Society. Whampoa was a merchant in the shipping
business and the only Chinese member of the Legislative Council. See Trocki, Opium and Empire, 152-153.
29 Reid, “Early Chinese Migration into North Sumatra,” 297.
30 James C. Scott, Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1998), 76-83.
27
28
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twenty migrants from China to record the names and details of every person on board.31 The
Officer would then issue a pass for migrants without contracts.
For Governor Ord, the allegations of “kidnapping” floating around were unacceptable,
as it suggested that slavery was occurring under British rule even after abolition. He advocated
for expansive state regulation of the migration process. While the distinctions between indenture
and slavery remain a matter of ongoing academic debate, Ord was resolute in his insistence that
“it is our proud boast that the sun never sets on the British dominions, and that in those
dominions no slave can live.”32 The discovery of such a system of kidnapping and “slavery”
would stain not only the Straits Settlements’ reputation, but also the British Empire’s.
Supporters of Ord’s bill were invested in ensuring that the borders of the British Empire
preserved the notional “freedom” of the laborer. The Attorney General agreed that these
kidnapped laborers were “in the position of slaves,” working without willful consent.33 It was
imperative for the Straits government to ensure that the migrants who had journeyed across the
South China Sea to labor in Singapore did not work in Deli against their will. As the Attorney
General proclaimed, “if this matter was not dealt with Queen Victoria would have slavery in her
dominion.”34 The shadow of abolition continued to hang over these colonial officials who
asserted that any laborer within the British Empire, even indentured, was “free.”
Straits officials invoked caricatures of an “ignorant migrant,” as well as the moral
responsibility of the British state, to counter critiques appealing to unfettered immigration. Ord
described how newly-arrived laborers were “rude, uninstructed, and uncultivated, … knew
nothing of [British] laws and rules, and when they came here … fell into the hands of their

Nagendiram Rajendra, “The Straits Settlements 1867-1874” (Canberra, Australian National University, 1976), 91.
A similar system also operated in Hong Kong through the 1855 Chinese Passengers Act, but the Act mainly
regulated conditions on board ships and the process of emigration, rather than immigration. See Elizabeth Sinn,
Pacific Crossing: California Gold, Chinese Migration, and the Making of Hong Kong (Hong Kong University Press, 2012), 7690.
32 Ibid, 73.
33 Ibid, 75.
34 Ibid, 75.
31
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designing countrymen who made a trade of them.”35 The trope of the ignorant migrant was
found across the British Empire. Colonial officials in British Guiana, India, and Mauritius too
justified ever-expanding regulations on the migration of Indian indentured laborers by claiming
the “necessary ignorance” of the colonized subject.36 Like Straits officials who sought to
intervene in “free” migration to ensure the “freedom” of the Chinese migrant from unjust
contracts, administrators of Indian indenture justified state oversight on private contracts based
on narratives of the paternalist state and the easily misled, simple migrant.37 Ord had no doubt
encountered these principles in his career as a colonial administrator in the British West Indies,
Dominica, and Bermuda.38
Calls for the Straits government to pay closer attention to the flow of laborers to the
Netherlands Indies grew stronger in the following years, even as Ord’s proposals were delayed.
In December 1874, a group of twenty-six British and European trading firms asked Ord’s
successor Andrew Clarke to delay bills that would regulate Chinese labor immigration.39 But
even as these merchants clamored for unrestricted immigration, their petition emphasized that
laborers were being “hurried and cajoled” to work outside British jurisdiction.40 They pitied the
migrants that “in ignorance had been shipped away beyond the influence and protection of
[British] laws.”41 The petitioners demarcated the space of the British territories as one that
protected the welfare of the laborer, imagining the space outside, like the Netherlands Indies, as
one rife with oppression and violence.42 In arguing for the protection of Chinese laborers to be
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regarded as an emigration—rather than immigration—issue, these merchants made a striking
claim that the British colonial state possessed responsibility for the welfare of Chinese migrants
who had entered its borders, even though they were only there temporarily, and not as British
subjects.
An Imperial Inquiry and the Production of a Border
In 1876, the Straits government appointed a commission to enquire into labor conditions in the
British settlements, which produced evidence justifying tighter state control over labor
migration. In her work, sociologist Radhika Mongia describes committees of inquiry on Indian
indenture as “a general mechanism for the production of regimes of truth,” which functioned as
a “constitutive and constituting element of a discursive field.”43 The “kidnapping” of migrants
framed much of the 1876 Inquiry Commission’s discursive field.44
Testimonies from colonial officials in the Commission provided evidence that the
“kidnapping” of migrants to Deli was rampant, especially in Penang. The Penang police
superintendent Henry Plunket described how there were constant convictions for kidnapping,45
and an entire industry of kongsi members searching for migrants who would go to Sumatra.46 The
assistant interpreter Robert Karl mentioned that laborers had been sent off to Sumatra “many
times—sometimes seventy [laborers], sometimes two or three.”47 A former harbormaster
concurred, claiming that he heard “about half a dozen times” that coolies en route to the British
province of Wellesley were taken to Deli. Testimonies from Chinese brokers and merchants
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provide a more nuanced view of what “kidnapping” may have entailed. The broker Chio Kiam
Siang described how crimps would tell newly-arrived laborers that they had to “go across the
water” because there were no jobs available in Penang.48 The brokers had a financial incentive to
lie—they made a higher advance of $30-$40 when they got a laborer to work in Deli.49
Reid suggests that these laborers could perhaps be better understood as indebted
migrants who lost their freedom of movement, waiting for an employment agent to pay for their
fares, rather than as victims of an organized system of kidnapping.50 Often, the employment
agent willing to pay for their passage came from places like Deli that the migrants had never
heard of, especially when demand was low within British territory. When prosecuting a
“kidnapping” case by the captain of the ship Sunda in 1875, the Solicitor General of Penang was
surprised to find that the allegedly “kidnapped” laborers refused to be extradited from Dutch
Sumatra to serve as witnesses, thinking that they would gladly return to British territory with
their passage paid if they had been mistreated.51 Throughout the inquiry, “kidnapping” floated in
an ambiguous space triangulated from the colonial suspicion of Chinese depot-keepers and
brokers, the attempts of these Chinese actors to avert the colonial gaze, and the “kidnapped”
migrant’s own lived experience.52
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If bureaucratic rules had been put in place to prevent such “kidnapping,” Chinese
brokers were adept at bending them. The Commission discovered that brokers would pretend to
be emigrants and board a steamer headed to Deli, receive their advance payment from the
employment agent, and escape.53 They had no intention to leave Penang. The Commission
reported that a group of “bad characters” had waited until their steamer made its way into the
liminal waters between the British and Dutch littorals before attacking the crew; they escaped to
a nearby island with their payment.54 The Commission guessed that recruiting agents had to
“kidnap and sell any unwary ones among their fellow countrymen” because of the tremendous
financial losses incurred from paying advances to these escaped “emigrants.”55 Recruiting agents
also evaded police inspections on board ships by intimidating the laborers into claiming that they
left on their own free will. Sometimes, the agents also found men to impersonate the laborer
being questioned.56 Such narratives further reinforced the image of the naïve, ignorant migrant.
The Commission concluded that the emigration of laborers out of Singapore and Penang
to the neighboring Dutch settlements was rife with malpractice, justifying surveillance on
Chinese migrants exiting British borders. Interestingly, the Commission reported that the Dutch
colonial government implemented better protections on labor welfare compared to the British.57
The malpractice occurred in the process of emigration and in the in-between spaces where
Chinese migrants stood on the edges of British authority: the ports, Chinese-owned labor
depots, and ships.
By 1877, the Straits Settlements had put in place a new bureaucratic administration to
manage Chinese migration, forming a nascent regime of border control that solidified the
imperial divide in the Straits of Melaka. The Commission recommended the appointment of a
“Protector of Chinese” in Singapore and Penang to surveil new migrants and license all coolie-
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brokers.58 They also recommended the establishment of official depots under British control as
spaces where colonial officials would protect migrants from unscrupulous brotherhood
members. A broker working for a Sumatran planter would have to visit the depots with a doctor,
select the laborer they deem suitable, and take two photographs—one to be kept by the
Protectorate as a form of identification.59 The broker would then take the laborer to the
Protectorate, where he would put his signature on an English contract, receiving a Chinese copy.
On the ship, the agent’s representative would come on board to scrutinize each laborer
according to their photograph. With each procedure, screening, and document required, once
mobile Chinese migrants and brokers discovered new barriers in the corridor across the Straits
of Melaka.
The Dutch Border
The 1870s likewise saw Batavia increasingly exercising its power over the Anglo/Dutch frontier
as it incorporated Deli into the institutional fabric of Dutch rule. Batavia’s control over Eastern
Sumatra had consisted of indirect rule over the Siak Sultanate, which counted several indigenous
states including Deli among its dependencies.60 In 1864, a year before Nienhuys first brought
Chinese workers from Penang, the Dutch sent controleurs, or district officers, for the first time to
Deli and Batubara as a show of administrative authority.61 Yet military and colonial police
presence continued to be thin even by the early 1870s. The police force in Deli consisted of only
one manager and twelve armed policemen, and none of them were stationed in the other
plantation districts of Langkat and Serdang. The historian Jan Breman noted that Deli had a
reputation as “the Wild West” of the Netherlands Indies.62
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The expansion of colonial jurisdiction over the Chinese in Deli featured prominently in
the solidification of Dutch government control, which limited the movement of Chinese
migrants. An agreement from 1862 between the Sultan of Deli and Batavia had affirmed that the
Sultan possessed jurisdiction over “Foreign Orientals,” a category that mainly encompassed
Chinese and Arabs.63 As the tobacco industry expanded in the late 1860s, the Sultan granted
plantation managers the ability to exercise legal authority over their own employees, including
the Chinese, in cases of offences and minor crimes. They devised their own contracts and wage
arrangements, punished their workmen, and ruled in disputes.64 Planters even gained the
authority to operate their own police force.65 The colonial government began to exert its
authority in 1872 when the Sultan of Deli issued a new declaration that all Europeans, Chinese,
and Indians who worked on agricultural enterprises were to be classified as government
subjects.66 Authorities in Batavia had become alarmed by the Sultan’s use of the death penalty.
Planters tried to wrestle back control and filed a petition of complaint to reclaim legal and
policing powers over their Chinese employees. Yet to their dismay, Batavia extended the
Assistant Resident of Deli’s jurisdiction over the Chinese in 1873, thus affirming the colonial
government’s legal control over migrants in the frontier. Through laws like the Staatsblad 1872,
Dutch authorities also required all temporary visitors classified as “Foreign Orientals” to register
for an entry permit at an Immigration Office and restricted Chinese from entering city quarters
they were not assigned to.67
Like the colonial bureaucrats in the Straits Settlements, the planters in Deli began to
systematize the screening of migrants entering Deli out of frustration with Chinese brokers they
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accused of manipulating the labor trade. In 1879, forty-one plantation companies formed the
Deli Planters Association (DPV) to better lobby for their interests and cooperate against what
they saw as the manipulation of brokers in Penang and Singapore.68 Even as the planters relied
on contracts signed in front of the Straits Protector of Chinese, they decried the “evil practices
of the Straits brokers,” accusing them of exchanging the “good, healthy men” who appeared
before the Protector for weaker men before they left British territory.69 Dissatisfied, the planters
sent laborers they found unfit back to the Straits Settlements.
Doing so was nevertheless expensive, and the planters tapped the local Chinese elite in
Deli to screen migrants entering the region instead. In particular, the planters appointed the
Chinese Lieutenant in Labuan to check the contracts of each Chinese immigrant as they arrived
in the port of Belawan.70 In Deli, planters first approached Lieutenant Ban The in 1880,71 and
when he retired in 1885, appointed the new Lieutenant Tjong Yong Hian to the role. Plantation
managers in the DPV agreed to only hire laborers with contracts prepared in front of the
Protector of the Chinese and signed with the approval of the Chinese Lieutenant or his agents.72
Both colonial governments on each side of the Straits thus managed the movement of poor
Chinese migrants across their borders by relying on the network and influence of elite Chinese
men—either as depot-keepers or legislative councilors, or as enforcers of contracts and
policemen for runaway migrants.
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Surveillance of the Chinese migrant to Deli increased as the DPV employed technologies
of photography and medical examination in response to pressure from the Straits Settlements,
drawing each migrant into the documentary fold of the two colonial states. The practice of
sending back coolies across the Straits drew the ire of the Protector in Singapore who threatened
to stop issuing contracts for Deli laborers unless the planters stopped sending back migrants
who had just left British territory. In 1881, both parties compromised to require planters to pay
for a doctor to examine the fitness of each coolie contracted, thus removing physical “unfitness”
as an excuse to deport the migrants.73 By 1886, the two parties also agreed to require a
photograph of the laborer to be attached to each contract.74 These photographs served to fix
each laborer’s image in print to prevent the dubious exchange of laborers mid-transit, defining
each migrant to be a unique, categorizable object to the state. To disincentivize the broker from
manipulating the identity of the laborer, the planter also made the broker financially liable to pay
for the return of each laborer they deemed to be “unfit.” Each broker also had to carry a powerof-attorney, ensuring that only those trusted by the planters were able to hire laborers.75 Hence
both the Deli planters and the Straits Protector found new legal and administrative tools to
further surveil and manage the flow of laborers across the two colonies.
Nevertheless, cross-border entanglements continued to result in jurisdictional
ambiguities in the legal court. In 1905, the Chinese coolie Wong Yew signed a contract before
the Protector of Chinese in Singapore to labor for ten months in Tebing Tinggi in Eastern
Sumatra.76 Wong Yew left his employer after working for three days and absconded to Singapore
where he was arrested. He alleged that he had been ill-treated on the plantation. The public
prosecutor charged Wong Yew under the 1896 Crimping Ordinance, which compelled any
laborer who absconded to return to his employer. During the trial, however, the judge ruled that
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the British colony’s courts had no jurisdiction over a crime that was committed by someone who
was not a British subject and was supposed to labor in Dutch territory, even though his contract
was signed in the Straits Settlements. Extended jurisdiction was confined to British subjects, to
seamen on British ships, and residents of British protectorates.77 The new territorial border
hence also appeared in the legal sphere, fixing the jurisdictional category of a Chinese labor
migrant in Deli, even as he appeared in the British colonies on his first stop in the corridor.
Chapter Conclusion
The Chinese migrant to Deli was a central figure in the imperial entanglements of Dutch and
British colonial interests: efforts to control the movement of these migrants reinforced the
concurrent project of border-making. The obsession that colonial governments held over the
“freedom” of migrants, and the narrative these states put forth of duplicitous brokers and
helpless coolies, led to the emergence of systems of surveillance that strengthened borders in the
Straits of Melaka. This chapter has narrated the story of colonial officials and the obstruction of
the corridor. The next turns the focus to the transformations that Deli planters sought to bring
through its redirection, and the planters’ discovery that coolies—especially those who gained
mobility as recruiters—were not as helpless as imagined. In fact, the system of rules and
documents regulating migration proliferated as colonial officials became concerned with how
migrants enacted “freedom” on their own terms.
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CHAPTER TWO
CONTESTING THE CORRIDOR, 1882-1905

I have come to bring about Immigration on which tobacco agriculture thrives / … /
When a boat comes, everyone is happy and delighted
No! None of this would have happened
Without the Immigration Bureau
—Then and Now (1894)78
Thus read a verse sang by the character of “the Immigrant” in a musical play commemorating
the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Deli Maatschappij.79 The verse’s imagery of a boat and the
Immigration Bureau emerged at a time when planters had established direct lines of labor
recruitment from Xiamen and Shantou to Sumatra, bypassing the Straits Settlements as a node
of transit. In 1889, Deli planters secured a permit from Qing bureaucrats for emigrants to leave
directly for Deli. The Deli Planters Association (DPV) established a private Immigration Bureau
that regulated such mobilities outside of the colonial administration.
The DPV’s formation of a direct channel of recruitment from southern China was an
inter-imperial attempt at constructing a new route of migration, which would maintain Dutch,
instead of Chinese, control over the China-to-Deli corridor. But even as the Deli planters
attempted to wrestle control away from Chinese brokers and merchants in the Straits
Settlements, the DPV relied on the pre-existing Chinese networks of coolies working on Deli’s
plantations to recruit new migrants. The DPV’s dependence on these recruiters fed into a
reinforcing loop of perennial anxiety over their trustworthiness, which in turn, fostered the
creation of an ever-expanding bureaucratic regime of documents meant to minutely control their
actions. Nevertheless, the recruiters and brokers found ways to evade and resist the DPV’s
attempts at control.
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Redirection and Negotiation
By 1882, Deli planters had become suspicious of Straits officials like Pickering and saw them as
susceptible to the interests of Chinese plantation owners in British Malaya. Planters like J.F.
Cremer, manager of the Deli Maatschappij, were angered that officials from the Chinese
Protectorate met with Khaw Boo An, a rich Teochew sugar planter in Wellesley.80 Together with
a group of Chinese merchants in Penang, Khaw had met with the Assistant Protector Karl to
convince him to ban Deli recruiters until the demand for labor in Singapore and Penang was
fulfilled.81 Khaw asserted that Chinese emigrants had “no real wish to go out of British
territory,” and were deceived to leave for Deli, where they are cheated by Chinese overseers that
kept them in debt.82 Chinese plantation owners like Khaw had a vested interest in keeping
laborers within the British colony, as they competed for workers on their plantations in
Wellesley, Kedah, and Perak.83 The DPV concluded that having Singapore and Penang as nodes
of transit impeded the flow of labor to Deli. The Deli planters attempted to send their own
agents to recruit laborers from China through the Straits Settlements, but the agents reported
that they found “little assistance and encouragement from officials.”84 Straits officials found
trivial errors in the agents’ paperwork, forcing them to return to Sumatra to revise their
certificates of authorization.85 When the agents returned to Singapore, the emigrants they
brought had dispersed.

J.F. Cremer and Deli Planters’ Committee, “The Deli Coolie Question” (Deli: Deli Planters’ Committee, 1882),
Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, 18.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid, 14.
83 The Labor Commission of 1890 reported that merchants and brokers who testified in the commission regarded
competition for labor with Sumatra as a contributor to the scarcity of Chinese labor in the Straits Settlements. See
C.O. 275/41, 183.
84 J.F. Cremer and Deli Planters’ Committee, “The Deli Coolie Question,” 7. In 1889, the planters had also set up a
regular service between Deli and Singapore through the Ocean Steamship Company, allowing for the direct
transshipment of laborers from one blue-funnel steamer to another, thinking that it would allow them to be
exempted from the onerous regulations in the Straits Settlements. Yet, the Protector still brought laborers to sign
contracts before him.
85Ibid.
80

21

Planters were even warier of Chinese brokers and depot-keepers who they feared held
enormous power to influence the migrant’s decisions. In a public spat with Pickering, four
planters from the DPV wrote that the “smallest interference on the slight flaw in formalities [in
the Straits Settlements] … is calculated to arouse suspicions in the very suspicious Chinese
nature.”86 They speculated that the Chinese elite and British officials in the Settlements colluded
to prevent laborers from going to Sumatra. In 1886, the Chinese newspaper Lat Pau in Singapore
published an article decrying horrible labor conditions in Deli.87 The four planters suspected that
Chinese brotherhoods had spread such news to discourage migration to Deli. Even the Straits
Protector Pickering suspected that the brokers were deliberately sullying Deli’s reputation, as the
terms offered by the Deli planters would “deprive them of the exorbitant squeezes which the
weakness of the Protectorate staff at Penang allows them to make there.”88 More importantly,
the planters were frustrated that brokers controlled prices to bring laborers across the Straits. As
the Deli Courant newspaper saw it, “coolie merchants had appropriated a monopoly of the coolie
supply.”89 Brokers demanded a price of $129 for each Hailokhong laborer recruited and $75 for
each Hakka recruited, which the planters deemed as extortion.90 The various plantations banded
together in 1885 to fix payments of $50 for each laborer, but the cartel broke when some owners
realized that they could obtain a larger number of workers outside it.91
Frustrated with Chinese capture over networks that facilitated migration across the
Straits Settlements, Deli planters desired to establish a direct corridor of movement from
southern China in a deliberate attempt to maintain their control. In later retellings of these
efforts, company spokesmen declared that the planters had one aim: “to become independent of
the brokers in the Straits,” “to get out of their hands,” and “break their influence.”92 In their

Ibid, 18.
Bool, De Chineesche Immigratie Naar Deli, 4.
88 “Report on the Chinese Protectorate, Singapore, for the year 1890,” C.O. 275/25, 127.
89 “De koelies op de ondernemingen ter Oostkust van Sumatra,” Deli Courant, February 17, 1903.
90 Bool, De Chineesche Immigratie Naar Deli, 4..
91 Bool, De Chineesche Immigratie Naar Deli, 4.
92 Bool, De Chineesche Immigratie Naar Deli, 6 and Sandick, Chineezen Buiten China, 328.
86
87

22

eyes, the Chinese brotherhoods in Singapore and Penang were “portly scroundels” with “tricks
and gimmicks,” which had “secured for themselves the monopoly of the commonest human
trade.”93
In 1886, four of the largest tobacco companies in Deli appointed the sinologist J. J. M.
de Groot to advocate for their interests in China and establish a direct channel of migration. The
wide authority de Groot obtained to represent the companies in official negotiations shows how
minor administrators in bureaucracies often shaped the nature and practice of imperial power.94
The companies heard of de Groot’s plans to visit China for a scholarly project and issued a
power-of-attorney to give him all legal rights to secure laborers for Deli.95 De Groot spent much
time in Xiamen and Shantou meeting with local administrators, planning to contract Teochew
laborers to leave from Xiamen for Sumatra. Suspicious that British merchants had vested
interests to thwart the Deli planters’ plans, de Groot avoided Shantou, which had a large British
presence. What Diana S. Kim calls “the strength of weak actors” in her work on the prohibition
of opium in Southeast Asia is apparent here.96 In this case, Dutch scholars of China, who
occupied less prestigious positions compared to those in the colonial civil service, became
conduits of empire that produced new routes for indentured migration.97
German private and state actors in China were central to the planters’ efforts, illustrating
the importance of formal and informal networks between European empires in the coolie trade.
De Groot soon discovered that since he was a private citizen, local Qing administrators did not
judge his standing highly.98 The Dutch consulate in Guangdong had shut down, leaving non-
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Dutch businessmen recognized as honorary consuls present in southern China.99 The Qing
“regarded the Dutch flag as nothing more than decoration for a trading house,” and de Groot
was too suspicious of the British merchant who acted as Dutch Consul in Shantou.100 Instead, de
Groot contracted two German shipping companies, Pasedag and Co. in Xiamen, as well as Lauts
and Haysloop in Shantou, to secure a permit for this new route. He also approached the
German Consul in Shantou, Freiherr von Seckendorff, alongside his counterparts in Guangdong
and Xiamen. The German consuls had a vested interest in the success of the Deli planters’
project, as it brought revenues for German trading houses and steamship companies.101
The Dutch Minister-Resident stationed in Shanghai, J.H. Ferguson, was of little help as
he opposed the coolie trade, another striking example of how individual bureaucrats maintained
power as nodes in the exercise of imperial sovereignty. De Groot and the planters suspected that
Ferguson deliberately failed his task to increase the flow of laborers from China to the
Netherlands Indies because of his opposition to the coolie trade.102 De Groot noted in his diary
that in April 1888, Ferguson even told him to abandon all efforts to establish the new route for
the direct recruitment of laborers to Sumatra.103 De Groot was incensed, expressing his
astonishment that: “That is the first time a high-ranking civil servant tries to persuade me, also a
civil servant, by lies, to neglect my duty. How low that man’s morality must have sunk! And what
stupidity on his part not to understand that I should grasp who the real cheat was.”104
Nevertheless, Dutch records show that upon arrival in China in 1873, Ferguson did inquire
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about such a route to the Qing Zongli Yamen (Foreign Office).105 But the Qing responded that
the Dutch had to follow regulations the Qing proposed to British and French diplomats in the
1866 Emigration Convention, which would require a Chinese Consul to be placed in the
Netherlands Indies—a request the Dutch would not accept.
It is perhaps more accurate to describe Ferguson not as an opponent of the entire coolie
trade, but as a supporter of greater Qing regulation over the migration of Chinese laborers.
Ferguson made his distaste for the industry of Chinese indenture clear in his book, The Philosophy
of Civilization. Noting that “Asiatic coolie-traffic and the African slave trade stand as yet in dusky
array against civilization,” Ferguson decried “civilized Governments” like the Netherlands that
continued in the “lucrative trade in human beings” through Chinese labor.106 Ferguson instead
praised the “present enlightened government of China, who in their noble effort to protect their
subjects from greedy labor speculators, have forbidden the engagement in China of Chinese
laborers under contract.”107 Contrary to de Groot’s claims of Ferguson’s obstruction, Qing
records showed that Ferguson did, in fact, communicate with Qing officials on the matter of
labor recruitment to Deli. He was amenable to working with the Qing, as he explained existing
Chinese migration routes through the Straits Settlements, responded to questions by Guangdong
provincial administrators to investigate allegations of abuse, and shared contract drafts for Fujian
administrators to review.108 Ferguson represented an alternative way to establish a route of
migration that invited the Qing imperial state to assert its own claims over the corridor.109
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The DPV’s successful redirection of the China-to-Deli corridor was hence anchored in
the efforts of its German allies.110 The Deli Company’s spokesman Bool bragged that when
authorities in Fujian and Guangdong demanded that consuls be put in place in Sumatra to
protect the laborers, the German consul bribed lower-ranked officials to produce reports that
showed how laborers were treated well in Deli.111 The German consul used his relationship with
administrators in Shantou to produce a favorable report for the Governor-General of
Guangdong and Guangxi, Zhang Zhidong, who possessed the authority to approve of direct
emigration.112 The Qing records, however, suggest that Qing officials also exploited these
negotiations to fulfill their own interests.113 They succeeded in getting the German consuls and
the DPV’s representatives to draft regulations that, at least on paper, would ensure humane
conditions on migrant ships, provide a proper burial, and require the use of a Qing-approved
contract. On April 29, 1889, the Qing allowed the emigration of migrants to Deli. The first
arrival of the German steamer “China,” which carried 70 laborers to Belawan Harbor, was later
burnished into the myth of Deli, and recounted time and time again in the Deli Company’s
histories.114
With the arrival of the first ship, the Deli planters created a new private, non-state
bureaucracy to manage the mobility of migrants: the Immigration Bureau. Although it was a
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private office, the Immigration Bureau retained a wide berth in managing the flows of these
migrants.115 It possessed three aims: to promote direct migration from China, to counteract the
influence of brokers in the Straits Settlements, and to supplement any shortage of coolies.116
Through this office, the DPV would be free of the “intrigues of Singaporean competitors and
jealous coolie hongs (merchants)” that they had depended on.117 A new bureaucratic system had
thus emerged outside of the state’s fold in the Netherlands Indies, producing new regulations
that would control the movement of emigrants from China.118
Spectacular Struggle, Everyday Resistance
Inter-imperial networks played a crucial role for the DPV to secure Qing China’s approval to
construct a new corridor of movement for Chinese emigrants to Deli. Yet whether a villager in
the southern coast of China would decide to migrate depended on the local connections of
Chinese migrants themselves. Soon after the establishment of the Immigration Bureau, planters
realized that they could take advantage of the pre-existing networks of the coolies toiling in their
fields to maintain and increase the size of the plantations’ labor force. Planters paid a
commission and reimbursed expenses for laoke (old-hands; 老客) to recruit new workers.
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As coolies were re-classified into laoke, they gained the opportunity to become mobile.
Laoke transited in Hong Kong on their way to Shantou and, in theory, could return to their
villages in the countryside of Fujian and Guangdong.119 Tang Sing Kah, a Teochew laborer who
worked at the Kwala Mengirim plantation in Deli, went to his village in Chaozhou.120 Others
who elected to return to Deli sometimes missed their direct boats and stopped by the Straits
Settlements, transiting in the ports they had perhaps once been in as newly-recruited laborers.121
The planters profited: the costs of obtaining a new worker with a laoke through the Bureau
amounted to $66, a third of the amount charged by brokers in the Straits.122
But while in theory the planters planned for the laoke to return to their villages, this
newfound mobility afforded the laoke freedom to recruit laborers where they could and where
they wanted, whether in a different province or without even leaving Shantou. Planters wanted
the laoke to return to their villages as they searched for the elusive ideal Chinese coolie: a laborer
who would adapt to the hot climate in Sumatra, was strong, and able to toil nonstop.123 And
indeed, some laoke like Kong Ha Hong, a Hakka laborer, recruited other Hakkas from his
village.124 Yet others skirted the rules listed by the Immigration Bureau, and found laborers from
shops that traded the debt of coolies in Shantou instead. The head overseer of the Paya Bakong
Estate, for example, worked as a laoke but refused to return to his village in Haifeng, claiming
that he “did not want to burden people from his village,” lest his relatives asked about him.125 At
one point, the laoke carried more cash compared to other professional recruiters, so they
received preferential treatment from shops trading coolie debt in Shantou.126
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Suspicious of their actions, the planters created a world of documents around the figure
of the laoke. Each laoke was to carry with him an English introductory letter specific to his name
that listed his company, estate, and the advance payment he received.127 The laoke was supposed
to bring his letter to Lauts and Haysloop upon arrival in Shantou to get it stamped before
returning to their villages. But he could only receive his payment on the way back when leaving
China. Each letter hid the amount of cash the laborer would receive with a complex code of 7
letters.128 The difficulties the laoke faced in receiving his payment, which he might need to
purchase necessities and pay for expenses, illustrate the planters’ anxieties that the laoke would
take the money midway, or even disappear into the bustle of the port-cities of southern China.
Perhaps planters were also worried that the laoke would misrepresent the amount of funds they
were supposed to receive, deceiving the staff from Lauts and Haysloop.
Planter imaginations of how the documentary regime would operate often did not match
with reality, manifesting as discrepancies or disregarded rules. Some laoke carried back letters of
introduction from two different companies, or carried letters with mistakes, and often received
advance payments for the wrong laborer. Others did not return to Deli, or contracted
themselves to another plantation.129 Lauts and Haysloop reported that several xinke (new
recruits; 新客) had devised ways to trick the system. On a ship leaving Shantou, two laoke tried
to claim their payment after seeing that the xinke they recruited had passed the medical
examination, only to find that their payment had been given to someone else.130 Apparently, one
of their xinke had pretended to be a laoke and received the advance from Lauts and Haysloop
instead. Laoke and xinke alike found ways to make profit within the system, feeding into the
planters’ worries of their inability to control all aspects of the migration process.
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The planters most feared that their dependence on Chinese workers to fill this corridor
with emigrants would mean relinquishing control again to Chinese actors in the migration
industry, resurrecting the specter of the Straits broker. In an 1898 trip to China, the interpreter
B. Hoetink warned the planters that: “The delivery of xinke is threatening to fall entirely into the
hands of the Chinese, … the Delian industry is in danger of seeing itself lose its control over
emigration, and find itself in the unpleasant position it used to be in vis-à-vis the broker in the
Straits.”131 The increasing anxiety of losing control over the migration process is not only
palpable in Hoetink’s warning, but also apparent in a circular sent by the Planters Committee on
August 22, 1898, asserting that: “The greatest advantage of our own migration is that it is wellmanaged and under European control … for once it is in Chinese hands again, we shall be for
good at their mercy and will have to pay exorbitantly high prices.”132 This constant worry
signified how the management of this corridor is better characterized as a contentious economic
struggle, rather than a totalizing form of dominance exerted by the plantocracy in the
Netherlands Indies.
The planters viewed the coolies, which came from different parts of southern China,
through a prism of racial hierarchies. Coolies who were Teochew (Chaozhou), Luichiu
(Leizhou), Hailokhong (Hailufeng), and Hokkien (Fujianese), and especially those from rural
villages, were considered as first-class.133 Keh (Hakka), Punti, Macao, and urban Hokkien men
from Xiamen and Beihai were second-class. Those of the first-class received higher contractual
deposits of $25, twenty percent greater than the latter. A 1913 handbook for young European
men aspiring to be an assistant planter in Deli reveals some of the planter’s racial logic:
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A Hailokhong is noisy, temperamental and hot-tempered; Keh and a Macau are calmer
and more tolerant, although more inclined to treat someone who they someone they hate
secretly out of the way or forge plans to do so. The Hailokhong is commonly mistaken
for the best builder, is stronger, better in able to do heavy work than the other tribes,
who, on the other hand, are more careful and tidier, though somewhat slower in doing
their work.134
The classification of these workers into tiers shows how Deli’s planters had commodified and
categorized these Chinese migrants through a warped logic of hierarchical stratification.
Shipping networks constituted the key piece of infrastructure that allowed the planters to
control the movement of a commodified “cargo” of Chinese emigrants. It was an expensive
investment: planters initially chartered steamboats, but revenues from passage fees were not
enough to cover the costs. In October 1890, the Immigration Bureau contracted the firm Meyer
and Co. in Hong Kong, which operated two ships to bring potential workers to Deli.135
Established in 1851, Meyer and Co. was a German firm that chartered ships for Chinese
emigrants leaving to California, as well as coolie labor to Chile in the 1850s.136 Meyer and Co.’s
role as a node in the transportation of labor migrants to Deli in the 1890s illustrates how, after
the abolition of indentured Chinese migration to South America in 1874, businesses that
facilitated the wider coolie trade to the Americas persisted to manage new forms of unfree
migration, now to Southeast Asia. Since 1904, the Bureau contracted two steamships from the
German firm Jebsen and Co. in Xiamen, whose ships were chartered by many Chinese merchant
houses to transport commodities such as coal, wood, sugar, rice, and livestock across cities in
southern China.137 The infrastructure that moved Chinese laborers to Deli was hence deeply
embedded in the inter-regional trading infrastructure of coastal China.
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Coolies and Straits brokers alike attempted to wrest back control over the corridor along
these infrastructures of shipping. Planters claimed that the maiden voyage of the ship China,
which brought laborers directly to Deli for the first time, only had a few men on board because
brokers in Shantou had incited potential migrants to not sign any contracts to Deli. Uprisings
also occurred on board ships. In 1889, 272 coolies on the China broke into open mutiny when
they saw the Singaporean harbor, threatening to throw the DPV’s recruiters off the ship unless
the captain allowed them to disembark, claiming that the recruiters in Hong Kong had told them
that they were going to Singapore.138 A journalist reporting this incident described how “it was
quite a sight to see [the coolies] scrambling over the sides into the sampan boats awaiting to take
them ashore.”139 The incident produced interesting jurisdictional questions of its own, as the
migrants begged the Straits officials to let them stay in Singapore instead of Deli. After
discussing with the German and Dutch consuls, the Chinese Protector in Singapore Francis
Powell decided to let the migrants into Singapore, as the Germans and Dutch had no authority
to detain them while they were under British jurisdiction.140 Similar events happened in
December, when migrants revolted on the ship Kiel, and again the following year, when 670 men
on the steamship Decima demanded to be transferred to Singapore, refusing to be processed by
the Immigration Bureau in Deli.141 The Residency of the East Coast of Sumatra even dispatched
a battle steamship with a detachment of soldiers on board in case further violence occurred.142
The planters blamed Straits brokers who spread rumors that the migrants would never be heard
of again if they ended up in Deli, even claiming that it was their modus operandi to get on board
ships to force each Deli-bound ship to stop in Singapore.143

138“Annual

Report on the Chinese Protectorate, Singapore for the year 1889,” C.O. 275/36, 96. See also newspaper
reports of the incident, “The coolie difficulty on the German steamship ‘China,’” The Straits Times, March 30,
1889; “The Coolie Trade, “The Straits Times, April 15, 1889; and “The Deli Coolie Trade,” Straits Times Weekly
Issue, May 23, 1889.
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid.
141 C.O. 275, 96. The Decima incident is also recorded in Sandick, Chineezen Buiten China, 332.
142 Sandick, Chineezen Buiten China, 332.
143 “Coolie brokers against Planters,” Straits Times Weekly Issue, 4 February 1890. The broker could well be a
scapegoat in these situations, but cases where labor intermediaries led strikes aboard ships are not unheard of in

32

In 1889, Deli planters accused brokers of conducting a massive propaganda campaign
against the Heng Thai hong (trading house) in Hong Kong. Heng Thai maintained twenty shops
that traded coolie debt in the port-city and possessed an exclusive contract to supply workers to
Lauts and Haysloop.144 Placards set up in Shantou called for the Heng Thai to be punished for
human trafficking.145 The Deli Company spokesman Bool described the placards to have
depicted “the fate of the coolies in Deli in the darkest of terms possible, and the sons of the
Chinese owners of the firm Heng Thai, the greatest barbarians.”146 Locals in Shantou had
accused the Heng Thai of kidnapping their relatives and extorting money, threatening to lodge a
complaint to the Qing administration.147 The issue was resolved when the Dutch Resident
Ferguson was able to get the Qing provincial administrator to release a statement condemning
the accusations, stating that workers in Deli were not oppressed and had paid for their passage
on their own means. Even the migrants’ home communities posed a challenge for the DPV
planters in their attempts to control the China-to-Deli migration corridor.
Chapter Conclusion
The task the Deli planters faced in redirecting the China-to-Deli corridor away from pre-existing
networks in the Straits Settlements had never been a simple one. Despite planters’ efforts to
exert control over migrants through bureaucratic and documentary practices, they often fell
short in practice when faced with the laoke, broker, and coolie’s own networks and ingenuity.
These attempts to shift the corridor revealed to us instead a fluid landscape of allegiance that
depended on political, economic, or geographic circumstance. While the Deli Courant warned of
an age of “Coolie Brokers against Planters,” 148 the vision of agency that emerges is not one of
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opposition, but rather one that is variegated. As we shift perspectives between the planter, the
Dutch Resident Ferguson, the xinke, the interpreter de Groot, the Straits merchant, and the
broker, we see that each of them enacted agency at multiple levels of the migration corridor,
even if it was circumscribed within their own structural circumstance. In the following chapter, I
will examine how both Chinese migrants and the Qing state advanced twin visions of the
corridor that added to its polyphony of voices.
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CHAPTER THREE
A CHINESE WORLD OF MOVEMENT, 1882-1911
Nine hundred and thirty miles to the north of Shantou, Zhou Yazhao spent his days in sweat,
fastening thick ropes and chains onto ships. In 1892, he was only twelve years old: a child who
left his home village in Wuhua County, Meixian, Guangdong to labor at a ship rigging company
in Zhenping, Henan.149 His family history was carved with the untold sins of migration. His
father left for the Netherlands Indies when he was young—a ghost who left no trail of letters
behind. Zhou lived with his sixty-year-old mother and uncle. They did not own land and offered
their manual labor to neighbors, who often refused them because of their old age. The family
spent many nights in hunger. Zhou left for Henan to lighten his family’s burdens and earn a
livelihood rigging ships. It was work he thought of as arduous and risky, but nevertheless
necessary.
As a twenty-year-old, Zhou visited the county’s capital. There, he encountered a labor
broker from Deli. Zhou later recalled: “The broker (ketou; 客头) deceived me. He said that it was
easy to make money abroad, and the work wouldn’t be as laborious as rigging ships. His sweethoneyed words fooled me.”150 Zhou found himself spending seven days on a ship to Sumatra’s
Belawan Harbor not knowing that he was to become a “piglet.” Zhou ultimately spent thirty
years in Deli’s tobacco plantations and only returned to China as an eighty-year-old in 1960.
How did emigrants like Zhou Yazhao think about their ties to “China,” and how did
“China” think about them? The China-to-Deli corridor was a zone where Qing China and its
emigrants worked out their relationship with one another—independently, but also concurrently.
On the one hand, laborers in Deli maintained ties with China that are tethered to their home
communities. They extended their traditional social and religious worlds onto the plantations,
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while maintaining an active channel of connection through the flow of letters and remittances.
On the other hand, the Qing government envisioned a relationship of state obligation, which the
Qing embedded in Confucian ideals of paternal benevolence, but articulated through a new
language of sovereignty and diplomacy. The China-to-Deli corridor hence became a space to
configure a globalizing “China,” as coolies reconstructed Chinese institutions in the land of
tobacco and Qing diplomats pushed for China’s integration into an international system of
sovereign states.
Migrant Imaginations and the Native-Place
As he arrived in the port of Belawan, a Hakka sojourner like Zhou Yazhao would
discover that cultural and religious institutions from his home province of Guangdong had
preceded him along the same migratory route. In 1884, the Dutch-appointed Major Tjong Yong
Hian built the Guandi Temple as a space for various clans from Guangdong to congregate. He
also constructed another temple for the sea deity Mazu.151 Even though rituals like the placement
of ancestral tablets in temples were expensive and often limited to the wealthy,152 epigraphic
evidence suggests that coolies like Zhou participated in religious life in Deli. The Zhenjun
Temple, a temple managed by Teochew emigrants from Lufeng County in Chaozhou province,
owned a wooden tablet that a laborer named Zheng Cifu donated together with other coolies
from his plantation.153 The temple was a center of worship for the deity Zhenjun from
northeastern Guangdong, a 13th-century soldier who achieved fame for suppressing pirates and
robbers. The wooden tablet suggests that poorer immigrant laborers in Deli used their own
meager capital to participate in the devotion of deity cults from their home provinces, staking
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their claims to the religious corridor even in the elite-dominated space of the temple. The
German photographer Charles Kleingrothe also captured a Chinese temple standing on a
plantation estate: its architecture an eclectic synthesis of traditional Chinese architectural features
and classical motifs. The temple likely served as a center of ritual for the coolies on the
plantation.154 There too, the labor migrant found means to reconstruct a sense of religious
connection to his native-place.
As the annual payday approached, coolies also gained the opportunity to watch a
performance of Straits Chinese street opera (wayang).155 The performance connected the laborers
to the broader Chinese world in the Straits of Melaka. Chinese foremen on the plantation would
pay a troupe that performed at temples and clan associations in the Straits Settlements to come
to Deli. The genres of wayang were often specific to each dialect group. For example, opera
troupes performing fujianxi, or a form of Hokkien opera in the Minnan dialect, would narrate
folk tales from Fujian through a melodic performance of song and percussion.156 In 1880, the
troupe seemed to have performed on make-shift wooden stages (Figure 6),157 but by 1900, some
estates had a dedicated theater for these performances (Figure 7), suggesting that it had perhaps
become a regular practice. By 1908, a Chinese opera company in Singapore even operated a
theater group that performed specifically in Deli.158 Kleingrothe captured a picture of a
wajanghuis, or “house for wayang” located between the coolie barracks on the Amsterdam Deli
Company’s estate, with a Chinese inscription writing: “the echo of the music rings loud” (餘音
嘹亮).159 Perhaps in the high-pitched operatic retelling of these regional folk tales, the laborers
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could hear echoes of their hometowns in Fujian and Guangdong, even if faintly, in a moment of
brief respite from the brutal violence of plantation life.
Laborers who had spent their lives in Deli incorporated their new homes into the
religious worlds they inhabited. The history of the Five Ancestors Temple (五祖庙) in Tanjung
Morawa, 16 kilometers east of Medan, offers an illuminating example of the construction of
local Chinese deity cults in Southeast Asia.160 Oral tradition tells of the murder of a Dutch
overseer on an estate. In 1871, the colonial police caught and arrested five laborers—Li Sandi,
Chen Bingyi, Huang Luoqi, Wu Tusheng, and Yang Guiling—who had allegedly murdered the
overseer as revenge for abuse.161 Although only one of them committed the act, the five men
had sworn a blood oath to the same brotherhood and refused to divulge the murderer’s identity.
The police sentenced the five coolies to death by hanging.162 Their bodies were buried in a
cemetery for migrants from Chaozhou, and a small temple was constructed in their memory.
Over time, the five coolies become venerated. One can enter the temple today to find five
sacrificial bowls placed in front of their tombstone.163 The apotheosis of these coolies into local
deities in the pantheon of Chinese folk religion suggests how these migrants fit their new
landscapes into old religious worlds, and found solace, if not solidarity, from these affinities.
Some laborers also joined brotherhoods whose organizational web radiated outwards
from the Chinese world of the Straits Settlements.164 Records from the Netherlands Indies
annual report in 1885 documented clashes between the Ghee Hin and Ho Seng brotherhoods in
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Deli, where “disturbances were so serious that police and military were forced to use firearms to
restore order,” reporting that many plantation coolies were members.165 As two prominent kongsi
operating in Singapore and Penang, the Ghee Hin and Ho Seng’s presence in Deli showed how
networks of Chinese social organization crossed the border in the Straits of Melaka to create
alternative geographies rooted in Chinese kinship and commercial ties.166 As early as 1869, the
sinologist Maurits Schaalje discovered a brotherhood’s diploma in Deli held by a Chinese man
from Penang.167 The diploma referred to Penang as the brotherhood’s headquarters, generating
worry among Dutch colonial officials wary of the emergence of a strong cross-straits Chinese
network emerging amid attempts to enforce the Anglo/Dutch border.168
The 1894 novel Bright Celestials further illustrates how brotherhoods created a space that
connected Deli to Singapore, Penang, and the broader Chinese world. After detailing Tek Chiu’s
arrival in Deli, the novel follows the character as he meets two Penang-born Chinese overseers
desiring to form a branch of the Ho Seng brotherhood there.169 The two overseers extoll the
benefits of joining a brotherhood: it grants newly-arrived coolies “unskilled in the intricacies of
the foreigner’s law” protection against injury, provides them with “friendly aid and sympathy,”
and offers a community where Chinese traditions are preserved.170 In the novel, Tek Chiu
ascends the ranks on the plantation to become an overseer and leads 223 Chinese workers
through an initiation ritual on a secluded part of the estate. There, they establish the “Great
Dragon Lodge” branch of the Ho Seng brotherhood. One of the overseers had sent the Ho
Seng’s official insignia from Penang, as well as other ritual paraphernalia, including regalia,
scrolls, and books for the ceremony. The authors Tan and Lamont write, “the physical
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surroundings of that great meeting were literally in consonance with the conditions that
surrounded the inception, in the reign of the Emperor Kangxi, of the Heaven and Earth Society
of China.”171 The rituals of brotherhood produced a new imagined Chinese space based on
compatriotism and corituality even within the plantation estate.172
Surname and native-place associations tied these migrants further to their home
communities, if not in life, then in death. The social structure of Chinese emigrants revolved
around the burial ritual.173 For poorer overseas Chinese, lineage organizations functioned to
provide funerals that conformed with ritual practice, especially for those whose remains could
not be shipped back to China.174 Tombstones marked with lineage surnames dating as early as
1876 dot the landscape of the Chinese cemetery in Labuan.175 Common graves for those of the
same dialect group could also be found across various cemeteries in Deli, including in the
Chaozhou Cemetery where the five apotheosized coolies were buried.176 Yet at least in 1889 it
had been custom for estates to shovel their dead into a piece of wasteland. 177 The ability to join
one’s own lineage in death might have been the privilege of a select few.
In life, laborers maintained ties with their homes through qiaopi, letters and remittances
that flowed back across the migration corridor.178 Families in the villages of Guangzhou and
Fujian waited for traces of news from their loved ones. In 1889, a riot occurred in Xiamen
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protesting the disappearance of relatives.179 The DPV defended itself for not being able to send
the letters sent by the coolies, blaming the coolies for addressing them vaguely.180 Since this issue
occurred, the Immigration Bureau took over the sending of the workers’ letters. Laoke returning
to China would bring these letters alongside cheques for coolies’ families. From 1903 to 1907,
the Immigration Bureau processed an annual average of $160,982 in remittances.181 The
mechanisms that facilitated the recruitment of laborers to Deli hence also transmitted the
material goods that tied them to their native-place.
In 1905, Major Tjong Yong Hian and his nephew Lieutenant Tjong A Fie established the
Tong Sian Kiok bank to facilitate the transfer of the laborers’ remittances to China, further
intensifying this form of connection.182 Through the Tong Sian Kiok, Chinese workers in Deli
were able to regularly send qiaopi to their relatives.183 But while qiaopi is commonly understood as
a migrant form of connection, Deli’s plantation owners could also manipulate these Chinese
networks for their own commercial interests. Recognizing that familial networks in the nativeplace undergirded the movement of Chinese emigrants, the colonial interpreter Hoetink
emphasized in the Deli Courant that the coolie had aimed “to return to China with cash, and
especially to be able to send money to his relatives in absence.”184 Preventing the flow of
remittances would mean that Deli’s reputation as a promising destination would deteriorate. The
DPV even issued a circular reminding estate owners to urge coolies to send remittances home
several times a year.185 The interests of the plantation elite and the coolie migrant overlapped to
further deepen the transportation of money across the corridor.
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For the emigrants, “China” remained largely in the realm of kinship, shared native-place
bonds, and religion. The China-to-Deli corridor was a space where both material goods and
cultural institutions traveled, often through networks that defied colonial borders. Yet such
imaginations contrasted with the Qing government’s ambitions to protect its emigrants. Since
1881, the Qing state began to advocate for the Deli laborers’ rights to consular protection. The
Qing government hence imbued the migration corridor with a different set of meanings that
linked perceived helpless subjects in Deli to the Chinese state, rather than the migrants’ own
channel of connections between the plantation and the native-place.
Qing Protection and State Sovereignty
The efforts of the Qing government to protect emigrants was rooted in a new
consciousness over national sovereignty that emerged in Qing China’s encounter with the
indentured trade to Cuba and Peru. The Qing government’s navigation of international politics
from 1860 to 1874 planted the seeds of a revolutionary change in China’s articulation of
sovereignty and diplomacy. Even though the British and French refused to ratify the Qing’s
proposed regulations in the Emigration Convention of 1866, Qing officials learned to define
China’s interests in terms of the rights of its overseas population as they crafted rules that would
limit contract lengths and allow them to intervene in the recruitment process.186 The imperial
state was no longer the same as it was under the 18th-century Yongzheng Emperor, who labelled
the overseas Chinese as “not law-abiding subjects,” reflecting the popular sentiment of
emigrants as traitors (hanjian).187
Through investigative commissions sent to Peru in 1873 and Cuba in 1874, the Qing
government developed the new diplomatic practice of sending imperial officials abroad to
document the conditions of Chinese living outside its territorial jurisdiction.188 In 1874, amid
international outcry over the mutiny of coolies on board the Spanish ship Maria Luz headed to
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Peru, the Qing pressured the Portuguese to ban the coolie trade in Macao, and later ratified
treaties banning the trade with Peru in 1876 and Spain in 1878.189 When the Qing government
discovered that Chinese emigrants had also been laboring under conditions of indenture in
Dutch Sumatra a decade later, these innovative diplomatic practices emerged in a fuller form as
tools to assert a new understanding of Chinese sovereignty and the rights it conferred to protect
a perceived helpless overseas population.
In 1881, a low-ranking Fujianese prefect first alerted the Qing government to the plight
of Chinese emigrants in the Netherlands Indies. The prefect Li Mian wrote to the newlyappointed Governor-General of Jiangsu and Jiangxi, Zuo Zongtang, and called for the
placement of a consul in the Dutch colony. In his petition, Li emphasized the importance of
such diplomatic representation to protect the Chinese population in the Netherlands Indies and
to secure China’s coastal provinces against a Dutch military threat. Li painted a world where “the
West is encroaching on China,” and the Chinese emigrant population is suffering.190 He stoked
fears of Dutch military might and invoked the Dutch occupation of Taiwan during the Ming’s
reign, reminding Zuo that the Dutch had “caused trouble with the coastal residents of Fujian and
Guangdong.”191 Li even alerted Zuo to the events of the Aceh War that had begun since 1873,
where the Dutch succeeded in undertaking a military campaign to conquer the Muslim polity of
Aceh in northern Sumatra and gain full control over the island. Li framed the Dutch’s control
over Aceh as a launching pad to “slowly encroach on Zhejiang and Guangdong.”192 Since the
Dutch posed a military threat to China and controlled a significant number of Chinese subjects
in its territory, Li argued that the Qing government should assert itself and establish a consular
representative in the Netherlands Indies. While Li exaggerated the Dutch’s military capabilities,
as well as the distance between Aceh and southern China, his decision to frame the issue of the
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overseas Chinese in militaristic terms showed how, by 1881, even low-ranked officials in the
Qing bureaucracy understood the issue of the overseas Chinese as a pragmatic issue that was
intertwined with matters of foreign policy and national security.
Li’s petition worked its way through the Qing bureaucracy and landed on the desk of
Zuo Binglong, the Chinese Consul in Singapore, who affirmed that the Qing should engage with
its emigrant population in the Netherlands Indies based on principles of Confucian state
paternalism and international diplomacy. In a follow-up report written for Zuo Zongtang, Zuo
Binglong revealed how Qing bureaucrats worried that its migrant population in Deli had
renounced China.193 Writing that the Dutch have “treacherous intentions,” Zuo claimed that the
Dutch had recruited Chinese laborers to “change into foreign clothes” and “lure them to join
their Western nationality.”194 As historian Shelly Chan noticed in Prince Gong’s call for the
Zongli Yamen to begin protecting China’s emigrant population in the 1860s, the Qing saw
“emigrant labor [as] an instrument belonging to the Qing polity that should be respected and
returned.”195 Viewing the ties between China and its emigrant population in terms of Confucian
principles of state responsibility, Zuo argued that by establishing a consul in the Indies, the Qing
would “win the heart” of its overseas population who would no longer “give up their old
country even if naturalized.”196 Zuo noted that international law (gongfa; 公法) was an instrument
that could be used to exert pressure on the Dutch. Zuo argued that since the Dutch had allowed
the British, French, and Americans to place a consul in Batavia, the Dutch would perform a
“violation of public example and precedent” if they refused to let China establish a consul in the
Netherlands Indies.197 Doing so would violate the principles of reciprocity embedded in
international law. Zuo’s report offered a sophisticated articulation of Qing China’s sovereign
right to diplomatic representation. In his view, it was a tool to fulfill both the ideological
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imperative of Confucian benevolence and the pragmatic need to offer state protection to an
overseas population that seemed to have turned its back on China.
In 1886, the Qing’s plans to send an investigative commission to collect information on
the Chinese population in Southeast Asia resurrected the issues that Zuo had raised. The
commission followed the template established in the public debate over the coolie trade to Cuba
and Peru in the 1870s. Then, the Governor of Guangdong Jiang Yili argued that China should
emulate the practice of Western states to send officials to manage their subjects overseas.198 With
such commissions now becoming a regular practice, the initiative this time came from Zhang
Zhidong, the Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi, who had taken an active interest
in the overseas Chinese population. He worked together with Zhang Yinhuan, who had been
appointed as Chinese Minister to the United States, Peru, and Spain, to establish the
commission.199Although the historical scholarship on Chinese labor migration is often divided
between those focusing on the Americas and Southeast Asia, the issues of the overseas Chinese
in both regions were intertwined in the Qing’s eyes. As Zhang Yinhuan pushed for the Qing
court to approve of such a commission to Southeast Asia, he was also responding to the Rock
Springs and Hells Canyon massacres of Chinese laborers in Wyoming in treaty negotiations with
the United States.200
The Qing’s commission to Southeast Asia left Guangdong on August 25, 1886, just as
the sinologist de Groot was headed in the other direction to establish a direct corridor to recruit
laborers for Deli. Yu Zhun, a native of Guangdong and the former Chinese Consul in Nagasaki,
and Wang Yonghe, a native of Fujian, led the commission.201 They represented the two largest
dialect groups that constituted the Chinese population in Southeast Asia. While the
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commissioners planned to visit cities such as Singapore, Penang, Rangoon, Batavia, Semarang,
and Sydney, they only realized that there was a significant Chinese population in Deli on their
visit to Penang. The Qing records suggest that the commissioners had met with local officials
and merchants who alerted them to the plight of “more than 60,000” laborers in Deli.202 Bool,
the Deli Company’s spokesman, claimed that the planters had invited the commissioners when
they were in the Straits Settlements to improve Deli’s reputation.203 Regardless, the discoveries
that emerged in Deli would shape Qing China’s view of the conditions of the Chinese population
in the Netherlands Indies.
The commission’s visit to Deli was a moment of encounter between two “Chinas,” the
paternal state on the one hand and the migrant’s realm of clans and villages on the other. The
commissioners saw themselves as an extension of the Qing state, which had arrived in Dutch
territory to demand the rights of its subjects. Yu and Wang conducted a thorough investigation:
they toured plantation estates, interviewed the Chinese headmen, met with Dutch officials, and
collected evidence.204 While the commissioners were previously unaware that there had been
Chinese migrants in Deli, their visit provided them with an in-depth understanding of the
migration corridor to Dutch Sumatra. Yu and Wang picked up on the nuances of the coolies’
journey, noting that many of them had arrived in Singapore, only to be deceived to enter into
contracts for Deli, even as the migrants declared their consent in front of British officials.205
In their report on Deli, the commissioners painted an image of Chinese subjects in
despair, facing inhumane labor conditions from “evil” Dutch plantation owners and an unjust
legal system. The motif of the helpless Chinese subject is apparent in their narration of the abuse
of Wen Yalong, a coolie who had been beaten to death.206 His fellow workers had attempted to
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petition the Chinese Lieutenant in the Netherlands Indies government for justice, but their
efforts bore no fruit. The commissioners cynically commented that “to appeal to the Dutch
government’s officers is the same as letting the murderer loose.”207 In their view, the violence
they witnessed in Deli confirmed that Chinese laborers there required the protection of the Qing
government. The commissioners pushed for the establishment of a Qing consul in the
Netherlands Indies. Without a consul, there was “no one who could pursue charges of
exploitation and no one to act as an advisor for the Chinese.”208 The presence of a consul would
improve the relationship between state and subject, bringing the forlorn emigrant back into
China’s fold.
Qing officials began to collect evidence that would justify the establishment of a
consulate in the Netherlands Indies based on principles of international law, including petitions
from merchants in Java. A group of Fujianese and Guangdong merchants in Batavia had written
a petition calling the Qing court to address the unjust treatment they faced in Batavia’s legal
courts.209 The merchants also drew attention to the plight of laborers in Deli, describing how the
laborers’ “rights are seized by the harsh pitilessness of the Westerners.”210 Including the petition
in a written report, Qing officials emphasized how the Qing government must appeal to foreign
ideals of international law and reciprocity. The officials argued that the Netherlands would have
to accept the appointment of a Qing consul, as they “must be afraid of other people’s criticism
and dare not fail to abide to international law,” positioning both China and Netherlands as states
equal in stature subject to similar legal constraints.211 The officials conceived of a China that was
no longer a weak state forced into unequal treaties by conniving Western powers, but rather, a
China that could wield the tools of international law to “manifest its national prestige” so that
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Western powers would “no longer dare to ignore China’s kindness (善)” and “dare not scorn the
Chinese emigrants.”212 The protection of migrants in Deli was hence a manifestation of national
sovereignty and an assertion of China’s rightful place in the Western-led system of nation-states.
With such evidence, Zhang Zhidong memorialized the court to establish consuls across
the Nanyang, including a Vice-Consul in Deli.213 Zhang emphasized that Dutch plantation
owners in Deli had violated local laws, abused coolies, and failed to list the coolies’ rights in their
contracts.214 The general Li Hongzhang agreed with Zhang’s recommendations.215 He noted that
the Deli planters’ strong desire to recruit coolies from China offered an opportunity for
provincial administrators in Guangdong and Fujian to negotiate regulations that would prohibit
the abuse of Chinese migrants in Deli. Li saw the Deli emigrant’s plight as intertwined with the
1882 Chinese Exclusion Act in the United States and anti-Chinese campaigns in Australia.216
Were the Qing able to abolish the abuse in the migration of Chinese laborers to Deli, the
plantations would be an attractive alternative for poor coastal Chinese men to migrate amid the
ban in Chinese migration elsewhere.217 Li took a pragmatic view towards migration in
recognizing that sojourning was a primary form of livelihood for many families on China’s
southeastern coast. Li’s approach is reminiscent of Emperor Kangxi’s reversal of the maritime
ban in 1694, which Kangxi justified by recognizing the historical dependence of China’s coastal
provinces on maritime trade and the economic income they derive from such trade. Li applies a
similar lens here on the issue of migration.218 Thus, not only did Qing officials articulate ideas of
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state sovereignty through the China-to-Deli corridor, but they also deployed the route itself as a
negotiating token to reconfigure power relations in the realm of international diplomacy.
The significance of the Qing government’s assertions was not lost on Dutch
commentators who viewed these efforts as a signal that China had entered the “family of
nations.” A Dutch writer for the daily paper Soerabaijasch Handelsblad in Surabaya, Java saw in the
Qing’s overtures proof that “a new spirit is prevailing in the great Mongolian empire.”219 Unlike
the past, Qing China was now looking to develop closer diplomatic relations with its neighbors
in Asia. While China had long been “outstripped by the smaller Japan,” the Qing’s assertive call
to protect its emigrant population in the Netherlands Indies now signified that “it is day in the
East.” For this writer, the Qing government’s explicit attempts to demand consular
representation showed that China followed what “other nations are doing for their emigrant
children,” protecting them in their overseas home and strengthening relations between “the
motherland and the emigrant colony.”220 The writer’s recognition of a change in China’s position
in the Darwinian hierarchy of nations showed how foreign observers too recognized that the
corridor was a potential space for China to articulate its sovereignty.
Nevertheless, the process to establish a consul in the Netherlands Indies dragged on for
the next two decades. The Zongli Yamen decided that negotiations with the Dutch would be too
difficult, and the issue of the Chinese in Deli was put aside until 1897 when Lu Haihuan, the
Qing’s Consul to Germany, Netherlands, Russia and Austria, restarted negotiations with the
Dutch government.221 Negotiations stalled again, even as Lu tried to include a clause demanding
consular representation in the Netherlands Indies in the post-Boxer settlements.
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In 1907, the new Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (waiwubu;外务部) sent the
diplomat Qian Xun to collect fresh evidence of Chinese emigrants suffering under unjust
conditions in the Netherlands Indies, restarting efforts to place a Chinese consul there.222 Qian
visited Deli, where he heard more than ten cases from coolies on the tobacco plantations, and
also received over one hundred petitions and letters detailing the miserable conditions faced by
the laborers.223 Reporting their conditions, Qian indignantly declared that the “Chinese laborer is
always drowning in the world’s evil waters and soil, laboring in the drenching rain and the
roasting sun.”224 He told a narrative of exploitation by Western powers, that Chinese emigrants
had “been tricked without exception to suffer abuse” whether by the Dutch, British, or the
United States.225 Moreover, like Li Hongzhang, he saw a possible opening that would allow the
Qing state to intervene in the complex orbit of indentured migration to Deli. The Dutch had
requested new routes for Chinese to emigrate, and the Qing government could seize this
opportunity (乘机) to gain leverage in negotiations.226 It could demand the establishment of a
consul in exchange for the recruitment of laborers the Qing had allowed in a piecemeal fashion
since 1889. Qian’s evidence was crucial for the Qing’s negotiators to restart talks with the Dutch.
On May 8, 1911, the Qing finally ratified a treaty with the Dutch ambassador in Beijing,
allowing a consul to be placed in Batavia. In many ways, it was an unfavorable treaty as it
afforded the Qing consul no diplomatic powers and no privileges of extraterritoriality.227 Before
the appointed Consul-General could arrive in Deli, however, in October 1911, uprisings had
started in Wuchang and spread all across China. Province after province declared independence

Ibid, 194.
Qingji Waijiao Shiliao [Historical Materials of Qing Diplomacy], Vol 204, 19. Qian Xun noted how “emigrant laborers
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and slowly dismantled the Qing state. The first Chinese Consul-General in the Netherlands
Indies only arrived in Batavia in August 1912, after the Republican Government took power.228
Chapter Conclusion
In Diaspora’s Homeland, Shelly Chan describes how Chinese time and space proliferated as
Chinese emigrants “spun off and became part of other histories” and China itself underwent its
own struggles to evolve into a modern nation-state, interdependently producing an “ever more
fragmented and more networked” China.229 The China-to-Deli migration corridor was also such
a space for the mutual constitution of these multiple imaginations of “China” and its extension
beyond the territorial strictures of the mainland. Even in the enclosed world of the plantation,
Zhou Yazhao and other coolies like him engaged with cultural, religious, and commercial
institutions tied to their home localities in southern China. Through their lens, we could see the
migration corridor as Philip Kuhn saw it, as a “social and economic organism” that connected
families and emigrant-sending communities to laborers in Deli.230 But in the eyes of the Qing,
the corridor served as basis to articulate the Chinese state’s relationship with its forlorn subjects
and to assert China’s place as one sovereign state among others. The China-to-Deli corridor
emerged as a space with multiple orders of meaning where Chinese emigrants and the Qing state
influenced each other to constitute a global China in the age of high empire.
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CONCLUSION
Most unpaid coolies are eaten alive by four sets of people: first, the recruiter and his agents in
China, including the ketou, who travels with the coolies; next, the depot-keeper in Singapore;
next, the planter’s agents—sometimes a foreign merchant’s firm; and lastly, the planter himself.
Now, young friend, be bold. Take my advice, and use your great ability to assert your rights.231
So warns Old Song, a former Chinese coolie in Deli, to the protagonist Tek Chiu on a
ship headed from China to Singapore in the novel Bright Celestials. Old Song tells Tek Chiu that
he has been deceived by a broker—that he will not live a rich intellectual life as a scribe in the
Straits Settlements, but rather toil as a laborer on a tobacco plantation. The quotation reveals
four actors in the migration industry that a Chinese migrant to Deli would face, each with an
economic stake in the enterprise. One can imagine the trepidation, fear, and feeling of
dispossession that these migrants faced on board. And yet Old Song’s admonition hints at the
migrant’s own agency, perhaps at the very least, his ability to “be bold,” to engage with and to
navigate the new environment he is about to enter.
The China-to-Deli corridor was a unique kind of liminal space. The corridor
accommodated multitudes of meaning as it weaved together distinct geographies and histories.
As the Straits Settlements and the Netherlands Indies sought to control the mobility of Chinese
migrants crossing to Deli in the 1870s, each side reinforced the forming Anglo/Dutch border in
Southeast Asia. In 1886, as planters dispatched Dutch scholars of China to Shantou, the Qing
sent emissaries in the opposite direction, leading to an encounter between the Chinese imperial
state and the Chinese emigrant. When planters redirected the corridor through the Immigration
Bureau, brokers mounted their own efforts of resistance, demonstrating the struggle of preexisting Chinese networks to regain control. At the level of everyday life and individual action,
the laoke and migrants found loopholes in the system of rules that the planters had created. The
coolies themselves participated in forms of Chinese cultural life, while they sent letters, goods,
and money back through the corridor, reinforcing ties to their native-place. The intertwined
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itineraries of these disparate historical actors illustrate only a slice of the complexity of interests
that were at play. It suggests that studying a single “migration corridor” can provide an
alternative map to analyzing the circuits of empire and culture that unfolded in late colonial Asia.
Such a map also holds the potential to reveal migrants as protagonists of their own
stories. In “Venus in Two Acts,” Saidiya Hartman reflects on the difficulties of writing about
enslaved women in the Atlantic world. She asks, “How does one recuperate lives entangled with
and impossible to differentiate from the terrible utterances that condemned them to death, the
account books that identified them as units of value, the invoices that claimed them as property,
and the banal chronicles that stripped them of human features?”232 For the coolie migrants to
Deli, it is perhaps these entanglements in the archive, the simultaneous obsessions of three
imperial states on the figure of the migrant, which reveal the imprints they left on history.
Indeed, these migrants not only asserted their own place in the world, but also through their
itinerant movements, shaped the form and practice of imperial states, of borders and laws, and
of culture and religion.
The historical imprints of these trans-imperial crossings re-emerged as transnational
encounters in the twentieth-century. During the Indonesian National Revolution in 1947, the
undercover Chinese Communist Party agent Ba Ren staged the legend of the five apotheosized
coolies as a Marxist play to shore up left-wing support in an ideological contest with Chinese
Nationalists in Medan.233 In 1960, Zhou Yazhao, the ship-rigger who left Henan for Deli in
1900, returned to a resettlement farm in Guangzhou in the face of state-sponsored anti-Chinese
discrimination in Indonesia, which led to the repatriation of at least 102,000 ethnic Chinese. 234
The migration corridor materializes again as a space-time continuum of movement, of power,
and of imagination that transcended imperial and national boundaries. It is there where we
discover migrants as a full historical force in their own right.
Saidiya Hartman, “Venus in Two Acts,” Small Axe 12, no. 2 (2008): 1–14.
Taomo Zhou, Migration in the Time of Revolution (Cornell University Press, 2019), 46-49.
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Bibliographic Essay
The idea for my Senior Essay germinated on a trip to Penang, Malaysia in my sophomore year.
In my travels, I was surprised to find that Chinese speakers in Penang spoke the type of Hokkien
that my parents and grandparents from Medan, Indonesia spoke: mixed with a little Malay, with
a specific tone and lilt that differed from its Singapore variant.235 The potential of studying
Penang and Medan together as a unit of analysis became clearer when I visited the merchant
Cheong Fatt Tze’s old mansion (built c. 1897), which detailed how he built an immense rubber
and tea business across the Straits of Melaka to Medan. I had also visited the mansion of Major
Tjong A Fie in Medan (built c. 1900) who, along with Cheong Fatt Tze, donated large sums of
money to build the Chaozhou-Shantou Railway in 1903. For me, these exhibits showed how
networks of Chinese migrants formed inter-Asian connections that linked port-cities in
Southeast Asia and in China. I was hence strongly attracted to the opportunity to focus on the
Chinese diaspora as a way to study mobilities that undermined national boundaries by following
the journey of migrants from their point of departure.236
Reading Eric Tagliacozzo’s Secret Trade, Porous Borders early on narrowed down my
research trajectory.237 Tagliacozzo’s vivid recording of individuals that criss-crossed the Straits of
Melaka captivated me, as he detailed a rapidly consolidating border that followed the two
colonial states’ expanding regimes of surveillance, military enforcement, mapping, and scientific
exploration. A particular chapter on the trafficking of human cargo struck me further. Before
then, I had not known about unfree labor in Indonesia. As I started surveying recent literature

I later learned that the dominant Chinese dialect spoken in Penang and Medan shared roots in the Chiangchew
sub-dialect, which distinguished the Penang Peranakan from their counterparts in Malacca and Singapore that spoke
with Baba Malay. See Hui Yew-Foong, “Peranakan Chinese in Penang and the Region: Evolving Identities and
Networks, Special Issue of the Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Volume 82, Part 2, No.
297, December 2009,” Journal of Chinese Overseas 9, no. 1 (2013): 93–94.
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on the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, I noticed that the literature tended towards studying
rich merchants like Cheong Fatt Tze and Tjong A Fie—whom the Qing Dynasty and Chinese
revolutionaries alike courted for their capital, business, and political networks—or intellectuals
like the scholar Dr. Lim Boon Keng.238 Studying unfree laborers in Sumatra allowed me to
complicate the vilified stereotype of the “rich Chinese” in Indonesia:239 often explained in survey
works on Indonesia as a remnant of the role that Chinese played as economic middlemen
between Europeans and native Indonesians.240 After reading Jan Breman, Karl Pelzer, and Ann
L. Stoler’s studies on the tobacco plantations in Deli, and Carl Trocki and James Warren’s work
on Chinese laborers in Malaya, I further realized that scholars have produced rich social histories
of laborers on each side of the Straits, but largely neglected the connections between the two
colonies.241 A 1970 article by Anthony Reid is unique in its focus on the migration of Chinese
laborers from Malaya to Sumatra.242 Reid’s research offered detailed insights on the mechanics of
migration, yet I was still curious about the debates, actors, and negotiations that undergirded the
creation of this corridor of movement, as well as the lived experiences of the migrant laborers.
When I left Yale in March 2020, I departed with a desire to trace the laborers’
geographical entanglements across Asia and address these gaps in the literature. I had secured
funding from the Council on Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS), the Jonathan Edwards Richter
Fellowship, the Mellon Research Grant, and the History Department Senior Essay Research

See Michael R. Godley, The Mandarin-Capitalists from Nanyang: Overseas Chinese Enterprise in the Modernisation of China
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2005): 29–66, and Wong Yee Tuan. “Hokkien Merchants and the Kian Teik Tong: Economic and Political Influence
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Fund. I planned to travel to the National Archives of Singapore, visit sister temples in Penang
and Medan apotheosizing the five coolies in Deli, and spend time in the Indonesian National
Archives and the National Library. I imagined combing through newspaper sources in Malay,
perhaps even finding photographs of laborers hidden in the reports of local administrators.
However, the pandemic worsened and I could not visit archives even in Jakarta. While
the CSEAS postponed its funding, the Richter Fund supported my enrollment in a program at
University College London teaching Dutch reading comprehension. The basic skills I learned
through this course proved to be valuable as none of the Malay sources I had hoped to access in
person were digitized, leading me to depend more on colonial sources.243 The process of
translating Dutch and Qing sources in my research was painstaking and time-consuming, but I
am grateful for the support of the Council of East Asian Studies language program for seniors,
which allowed me to use these sources to undertake my research through a trans-imperial lens.244
I began my primary research in English in the colonial records of the Straits Settlements.
In the C.O. 273 collection of correspondence, I read over fifty documents I selected based on
historian Paul Kratoska’s index, and combed through many more, only to find little mention of
Chinese emigration to Deli. In the annual reports of the Chinese Protectorate in Singapore,
however, I found careful recording of the number of emigrants that left the Straits Settlements
for Deli each year, along with occasional comments about laborers being “kidnapped” to the
Dutch colonies and the competition between Deli and Straits planters to acquire labor. The 1876
Inquiry Commission and the 1890 Labor Commission reports offered the most promising leads.
Deli was very much present in the officials’ questions and the witnesses’ answers. In addition,
digitized newspaper collections at the National Library of Singapore allowed me to find everyday
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instances of “kidnapping.” A weekly column on “Deli News” in the Straits Times further
affirmed that actors in the Straits were cognizant of and interested in events in Deli. I noticed
that concerns over “crimping” increased the Straits government’s anxieties over the fluid
movement of Chinese migrants. Reading these materials in conjunction with Adam McKeown’s
work on practices of immigration control emerging out of the management of Chinese migrants
in the United States, I realized that the institutions of migrant surveillance that took shape along
the Straits of Melaka had reified the process of border production that Tagliacozzo described.245
My initial attempts to search for Dutch materials were less successful. Inspired by Eric
Tagliacozzo and Oiyan Liu’s call to employ materials at the National Archives of Indonesia—
rather than collections in the Netherlands—to write transnational histories of the region,246 I was
excited to employ the archive’s scanning and photocopy service during the pandemic. Yet, the
archive did not retain papers from the Residency of the East Coast of Sumatra, and the slow
process it took to request the files I was interested in (a month for five documents) along with a
limit to view only ten percent of each folder forced me to shift to digital collections instead.247
Discoveries at Leiden University’s collections and Yale’s own libraries expanded my
research scope to another set of inter-Asian ties between the Netherlands Indies and China.248 I
found reports written by the Dutch sinologist Hoetink, a missive from the Dutch Consul
General Haver Droeze stationed in Hong Kong, and publications from Dutch officials and
planters in Deli. The imperial formation of this new corridor of migration complicated my initial
impression that Chinese migration remained largely under Chinese control in the late 19th-
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century. A commemorative book issued on the 50th anniversary of the Deli Planters Association
in 1929 and a 1904 book by Johann Hendrick Bool celebrated, and offered careful details of,
planter efforts to recruit laborers directly from China. I also found a 1909 book written by the
Governor of Sumatra’s East Coast, L.H.W. Sandick, on global Chinese emigration. Its appendix
included a copy of the regulations maintained by the Immigration Bureau in Deli and excerpts
from annual reports dealing with the Chinese population on Sumatra’s East Coast. In the
process of editing my draft, I had to cut my analysis of reports written by diplomats and
sinologists like Haver Droeze and Hamel, which detailed how Deli planters attempted to add
new nodes to this circuit of migration.249 In the end, I focused on a few key sources that illustrate
how Deli planters struggled to wrestle control of Chinese migration away from Straits officials
and Chinese brokers, as I desired to complicate previous narratives of the coolie trade to Deli as
purely a colonial affair and instead highlight the agency of brokers.
While reading these materials, I was reminded of historian Shelly Chan’s book, Diaspora’s
Homeland, which argued that indentured migration to the Americas ushered China’s transition
into a Western-led system of nation-states.250 I could see these same patterns reflected in the
sources from Leiden and Yale, which detailed Qing officials engaging Dutch and German
envoys in concurrent dialogues about consular protection and labor recruitment. The few works
that exist, such as Yen Ching-Hwang’s survey, have focused on the broad strokes of the Qing’s
diplomatic efforts, rather than the language of sovereignty and protection apparent in the Qing’s
correspondence.251 Paying attention to the particularities of this language showed how the
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patterns Chan identified in the coolie trade to Cuba and Peru also applied to labor migration to
Deli in the Netherlands Indies.
I thus ventured into Chinese primary sources through published collections of records
related to Qing foreign relations and the Qing embassy in Germany used in Yen Ching-Hwang’s
landmark research on late imperial China and indentured labor.252 These texts included reports
from Qing officials who visited Deli in 1886, petitions from the official Li Mian and the Batavia
merchant Chen Shi Lin, and memorials from Zhang Zhidong.253 But some of these texts proved
to be unreadable and difficult to transcribe. Fortunately, I was able to find additional documents
in Academia Sinica’s digital collections. There, I found more correspondence between provincial
administrators, as well as reports by the Zongli Yamen engaging with Dutch representatives. I
searched for mentions of these events in the Netherlands Indies press through the Koninklijke
Bibliotheek’s Delpher database, and discovered Dutch commentary on the Qing envoy’s visit in
1886 and the Qing’s push for consular protection in the 1900s. While I was unable to include
many of these sources in my final draft, I chose to discuss those that overtly illustrated themes
of sovereignty, allowing me to extend Chan’s analysis of the Americas to Southeast Asia.
A question hung over my head throughout this process: where can I find the coolie
speak?254 As I worked my way through the documents, I slowly found fragments where I could
catch glimpses of the lived experience of the laborers both in the Middle Passage and in their
destination. The Chinese Protector in Singapore included police interviews of migrants in his
report on “kidnapping.” I transcribed an unpublished handwritten memorandum by the colonial
official J. Stecher that offered details about the actions of laoke middlemen in Shantou. I also
discovered unique sources such as a 1979 collection of oral histories of Chinese laborers in Deli,
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richly illustrated photobooks, Wolfgang Franke and Claudine Salmon’s published photographs
of Chinese epigraphic materials from temples and cemeteries in Sumatra, and the 1894 novel
Bright Celestials.255 While I planned to also examine the laborers’ experience of the Middle
Passage, since I found sources like the medical inspector Kuenen’s report discussing conditions
on board migrant ships, I decided to omit those sections in my editorial process, as it required an
extensive discussion that was not central to the arguments of my three chapters.
Studies of migration are replete with metaphors of grooves, flows, corridors, networks,
and webs. One of my essay’s aims is to bring these metaphors to life through the stories of
laborers who migrated from southern China to Sumatra. It became clear that the migrant’s own
lived reality was enmeshed with multiple imperial projects in colonial Asia. Throughout my
research, I am inspired by emerging scholarship that studies inter-imperial networks and oceanic
histories.256 In a recent volume, Kristin Hoganson and Jay Sexton call for “connected histories of
empire” that traced imperial circuits beyond the British, grasping at networks from their “finegrained constituent parts.”257 As Sunil Amrith has noted, the journey of diasporas provide a
useful basis for studying such narratives.258 Through such a framework, I discovered that the
corridor of Chinese migration to Deli was a space with multiple orders of meaning, a palimpsest
that revealed the migrant’s own agency, but also the uneven and intersecting political, economic,
and cultural changes wrought by a multiplicity of historical actors in late imperial Asia.
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